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THE FIRST AMENDMENT INVALIDITY OF FCC

OWNERSHIP REGULATIONS
Jonathan W. Emord*
What kind of First Amendment would best serve our needs as we
approach the 21st century may be an open question. But the oldfashioned First Amendment that we have is the Court's only guideline; and one hard and fast principle which it announces is that
Government shall keep its hands off the press. That principle has
served us through days of calm and eras of strife and I would abide
by it until a new First Amendment is adopted. That means, as I
view it, that TV and radio, as well as the more conventional methods for disseminating news, are all included in the concept of
'"press" as used in the First Amendment and therefore are entitled
to live under the laissez-faire regime which the First Amendment
sanctions.'
In Syracuse Peace Council,2 the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC or Commission) eliminated the Fairness Doctrine.' It based its action
* B.A., University of Illinois, 1982; J.D., DePaul University, 1985. Mr. Emord is currently an associate with Fisher, Wayland, Cooper & Leader, Washington, D.C. and a member
of the First Amendment Task Force of the Center for Applied Jurisprudence, a San Francisco
research institute dedicated to maximizing constitutional protection for speech and press liberties. Mr. Emord is writing a book for the Center that analyzes the ideological history of the
American founding conception of free speech and press and proposes a unified first amendment theory for modem application. The views expressed in this Article are the author's own
and do not reflect those of Fisher, Wayland, Cooper & Leader.
1. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 160-61 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
2. 2 FCC Rcd 5043 (1987), aff'd, Nos. 87-1516, 87-1544 slip op. (D.C. Cir. Feb. 10,
1989); see also infra note 247 (discussing affirmance by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit).
3. Under the Fairness Doctrine, broadcast licensees must fulfill a twofold editorial duty:
(1) They must provide coverage to controversial issues of public importance; and (2) they must
afford a reasonable opportunity for the airing of contrasting views on those issues. See Report
Concerning General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143,
146 (1985), appeal dismissed, 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 86 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter 1985
Fairness Report]. The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC or Commission) elimination of the Fairness Doctrine did not address two other provisions which mandate access to
a broadcaster's licensed channel and thereby represent constitutionally suspect restrictions on
the broadcaster's editorial discretion. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1987) ("personal attack" rule);
id. § 73.1930 (1987) ("political editorial" rule). These rules remain in effect. See Syracuse
Peace Council, 3 FCC Rcd 2035 (1988); see also Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5063
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upon evidence of the Doctrine's chilling effect on the exercise of editorial
discretion by broadcast journalists4 and upon the existence of a changed media marketplace--one in which a plethora of media outlets and programming choices was thought to render "spectrum scarcity" an obsolete
rationale.5
The Syracuse Peace Council decision is destined to have a profound impact upon all regulation of the broadcast media. The Commission's invalidation of the spectrum scarcity rationale as a basis for content regulation
cannot logically be limited to content alone.6 Spectrum scarcity serves as the
essential underpinning of almost every FCC regulation and is the principal
factor said to distinguish broadcasting from the print media.7
n.75 ("We need not-and do not--decide here what effect today's ruling will have on every
conceivable application of the fairness doctrine"); Letter from Dennis R. Patrick, Chairman,
FCC, to John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 27, 1987) (Commission's Fairness Doctrine decision did not encompass political broadcasting rules, although issues arising under them "may come within its precedential
scope").
4. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5049-50; 1985 Fairness Report, supra note
3, at 159-90 (discussing over 60 reported instances where the existence of the Fairness Doctrine dissuaded broadcasters from affording coverage to certain controversial issues); see also
Comments of the National Association of Broadcasters, Gen. Docket No. 84-282, app. D
(Sept. 6, 1984) (documenting 45 cases of a chilling effect attendant to the Fairness Doctrine's
enforcement).
5. The Commission's 1985 review of the Fairness Doctrine had revealed "an explosive
growth in both the number and types of [media] outlets in every market since the 1969 Red
Lion decision [Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)]." Syracuse Peace
Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5051. The Commission concluded that "government regulation such
as the fairness doctrine is not necessary to ensure that the public has access to the marketplace
of ideas." Id.; see also infra note 247.
6. In Syracuse Peace Council, the Commission not only abolished the Fairness Doctrine
but carried its rationale for doing so to its logical extreme, laying precedent for the inclusion of
the electronic media within the first amendment's full protective cover. The Commission explained that the functional similarities, rather than the physical differences, between the broadcast and print media should guide constitutional evaluation of broadcast content regulations.
Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5055. The persistent print/broadcast distinction is
inextricably linked to a view of the licensed broadcaster as a custodian of an essentially public
resource. As one leading proponent of the public trustee model of broadcasting regulation has
written: "[T]he public trustee notion must be erased before a broadcast journalist can be guaranteed the same First Amendment rights as a newspaper journalist." Geller, Broadcasting and
the Public Trustee Notion: A Failed Promise, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 87 (1987). See
also infra note 213.
7. The Supreme Court has often identified spectrum scarcity as the "prevailing rationale
for broadcast regulation." See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n. 11
(1984); see also FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting (NCCB), 436 U.S. 775, 799
(1978). In Red Lion, the Supreme Court confirmed that "[b]ecause of the scarcity of radio
frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others
whose views should be expressed on this unique medium." 395 U.S. at 390. In NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), Justice Frankfurter explained that "[u]nlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is
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Spectrum scarcity has served not only as a basis for abridging broadcasters' rights to speak freely on matters of public importance, but also as a basis
for denying certain entities a right to speak at all.' This Article addresses
FCC ownership regulation, one aspect of the FCC's scarcity-based regulatory regime, which imposes constitutionally suspect restrictions based not
upon the nature or content of speech but upon characteristics of the
speaker.9 If existing ownership rules and policies continue to serve as models for regulation of the new communications technologies, freedom of
speech and press will become increasingly anachronistic. As society becomes ever more dependent upon audio and video technologies for access to
information and opinion and ever less dependent upon the printed press, the
compass of the first amendment's protective shield will shrink in scope, affording Americans less freedom to communicate and receive information.' °
Accordingly, this Article recommends that the core values of the first
amendment, embodied in the framers' original construct, be permitted to
transcend all means of communication equally.
This Article begins by setting forth a summary history of FCC ownership
restrictions, describing two distinct historical phases. The section discussing
the Commission's first regulatory phase documents the adoption of a complex of ownership restrictions that affect various communications media.
These restrictions were based primarily on fears of viewpoint monopolizawhy, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to government regulation." Id. at 226.
The Commission also relies upon what has become known as the "impact rationale" for permitting certain kinds of broadcast regulation. See Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 438 U.S. 726
(1978) (upholding the FCC's authority to regulate "indecent" speech). The impact rationale
focuses upon the pervasive presence and influential nature of the broadcast medium and suggests that this justifies regulation as a constitutional matter. See M. L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY
WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES 67-118 (1986) for a critique of this rationale.
8. The constitutional basis for the FCC's power to deny broadcast opportunities to able
and willing prospective licensees stems from Justice Frankfurter's oft-quoted dicta in NBC:
The [Communications] Act [of 1934] itself establishes that the Commission's powers
are not limited to the engineering and technical aspects of regulation of radio communication .... [T]he Act does not restrict the Commission merely to the supervision of traffic. It puts upon the Commission the burden of determining the
composition of that traffic.
319 U.S. at 215-16.
9. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388 ("Where there are substantially more individuals who
want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable first
amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write or
publish."). It is clear, however, that the general antitrust laws applicable to the print media
remain a constitutional and effective means of ending monopolistic practices in media ownership as they arise from time to time in specific cases. See Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945).
10. See I. POOL, THE TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 1 (1983); Sibary, The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 v. The FirstAmendment, 7 HASTINGS J. COMM. & ENT. LAW 381,
399 (1984).
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tion and "private censorship" that never actually materialized. The Article
then chronicles the second, or deregulatory, phase, involving the Commission's reevaluation of the extent to which the ownership restrictions actually
served their regulatory objectives-a reevaluation that resulted in repeal of
certain regulations. Although the deregulatory phase continues to this day,
deregulation of broadcast ownership remains incomplete because the Commission has yet to repudiate, as constitutionally repugnant, all forms of governmentally enforced viewpoint diversity. The Article next turns to a
critique of the spectrum scarcity rationale which has been used to support a
diminished degree of first amendment protection for broadcasters and has
served as the constitutional predicate for FCC ownership regulations, showing that the rationale is based on defective premises, and is, in any event,
obsolete in the current information marketplace. The Article then notes the
increasing disappearance of functional distinctions between the broadcast
and print media, and suggests that, absent the scarcity rationale, no principled justification exists for distinguishing between the two media for purposes of measuring the constitutionality of media ownership restrictions. To
demonstrate the bankruptcy of any print/broadcast distinction, this Article
traces the emergence of the first amendment, discussing the dominant conception of individual speech and press liberty enshrined in it, a conception
which demands that the government act as protector of a private communications reserve rather than a guarantor of viewpoint diversity. Next, it
shows that the FCC's assumption of a role as the guarantor of viewpoint
diversity in the broadcast media is premised upon a misconception of the
values operating in the first amendment. The framers of the Constitution
intended the first amendment to serve as a barrier against governmental interference with speech liberty in order to foster the development of a private
marketplace of ideas, not as a device for authorizing government-mandated
diversity in that marketplace. This Article contends that the erroneous notion, advanced by Professor Jerome Barron and others, that the government
not only may, but should, enforce a diverse "mix" of voices in the marketplace, drastically shrinks the scope of the first amendment's protection of
individual expression and places the government in the dangerous position
of regulating ideological commerce. The Article notes that the courts have
rejected Barron's thesis in the print media context, yet have embraced it in
the broadcast media context. The Article contains a proposal for affording
the broadcast press full first amendment protection, essentially through recognition of a property rights approach to spectrum ownership. Finally, the
Article concludes by advocating repeal of the FCC's structural regulations
as an essential predicate to completing the current salutary movement toward affording the broadcast press the same degree of constitutional protec-
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tion as its print counterpart. This Article contends that antitrust restraints
(which now operate to preclude print media market domination) are the
only constitutional form of structural regulations that may be applied to the
electronic media.
I.

A

HISTORY OF

FCC OWNERSHIP

REGULATIONS"

In 1924, at the third National Radio Conference, President Calvin Coolidge warned that, over time, the burgeoning new technology of radio could
become controlled by a select few who, by virtue of their exclusive right to
use this most influential medium, could determine what information the
13
public would receive. 12 Fear of future thought control by "media barons"'
obsessed the original advocates of radio regulation, including the vocal Representative Johnson of Texas. In hearings preceding the adoption of the Radio Act of 1927,1" Representative Johnson expressed the view that without
strong federal legislation, "American thought and American politics will be
largely at the mercy of those who operate these stations. For publicity is the
most powerful weapon that can be wielded in a Republic ..

."15

These fears of ownership concentration led to the creation of regulatory
barriers to market entry into broadcasting. These barriers have delimited
broadcasters' rights to free speech in markets across the country without any
specific proof of anticompetitive practices in the marketplace. 6 Such
11. Given the great number and variety of FCC ownership regulations, an article designed
to present an overall history and critique of the rules must necessarily selectively exclude some
rules from assessment. This history does not exhaustively explore the case precedent
underlying the various ownership rules; nor does it address in any depth the telephone
company-cable television cross-ownership rules, the program exclusivity rules, the syndicated
exclusivity rules, the cable network non-duplication rule, or the broadcast non-network
territorial exclusivity rule. These subjects would' require more detailed analysis than is
appropriate for a single article and are therefore left for another day.
12. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,
98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA: THE CASE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PARITY 25-26 (Comm. Print 1983).
13. See Johnson, Media Barons and the Public Interest, ATLANTIC, June 1969, at 43-51;
Howard, Multiple BroadcastOwnership: Regulatory History, 27 FED. COMM. B. J. 1, 67 (1974)
(discussing Johnson, supra).
14. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat.
1064.
15. 67 CONG. REC. 5557, 5558 (1926); see also To Regulate Radio Communication: Hearings on H.R. 7357 Before the Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8 (1924) (statement of Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce). In a 1924 House of
Representatives hearing, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover warned: "We cannot allow
any single person or group to place themselves in [a] position where they can censor the material which shall be broadcasted to the public ..
" Id.
16. In significant respects, the entire licensing system was designed to promote diversified
ownership of mass communications; indeed, as the Supreme Court explained in FCC v. Potts-
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broadly prophylactic regulations must be viewed as governmental restrictions on freedom of speech which, absent a "scarcity" underpinning, lack the
narrow tailoring needed to serve the government's interest in competition. 1 7
Consequently, the FCC's ownership regulations appear well situated for constitutional challenge.

A.

The Regulatory Phase

Since its inception in 1934, the Commission has construed its licensing
mandate to require the use of broadcast channels in a manner calculated to
foster maximal competition among broadcast licensees."8 The Commission
supports government-mandated competition as a means of promoting programming diversity.' 9 It assumes that each new media owner will offer a
new and different "voice" in the marketplace of ideas.
1. The Chain BroadcastingRules
In an effort to extend its procompetitive policies to the nation's broadcast-

ing networks and their affiliates, the FCC, on May 2, 1941, issued its Report
on Chain Broadcasting.2 ° This report contained eight separate regulations. 21
ville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940), "Congress moved [in enacting the Communications Act of 1934] under the spur of a widespread fear that in the absence of governmental
control the public interest might be subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcasting field." Id. at 137. The Commission derives its authority to regulate broadcast licensee
ownership structures largely from §§ 303(r) and 309(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(r), 309(a) (1982). See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting (NCCB), 436 U.S. 775 (1978); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351
U.S. 192, 193 (1956).
17. In the area of broadcast regulation of content, the Supreme Court has determined that
FCC regulations will withstand scrutiny only if they are "narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest." See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380
(1984). This intermediate level of scrutiny is premised upon the spectrum scarcity rationale.
Id. at 377.
18. See Telegraph Herald, 4 F.C.C. 392 (1937), rev'd sub nom. Sanders Bros. Radio Station v. FCC, 106 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1939), rev'd, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); see also Telegraph
Herald, 8 F.C.C. 322 (1940); FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM., REPORT ON CHAIN
BROADCASTING 80-87 (1941); aff'd, NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), amended by
Report, Statement of Policy, and Order, 63 F.C.C.2d 674 (1977) [hereinafter 1941 CHAIN
BROADCASTING REPORT].

19. See Spartanburg Advertising Co., 7 F.C.C. 498 (1939); see also Telegraph Herald. 8
F.C.C. at 324.
20. 1941 CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 18.
21. The chain broadcasting rules appeared originally at 47 C.F.R. §§ 3.101-.108 (1941).
In 1945, the rules were applied to television and additionally appeared at 47 C.F.R. §§ 3.631.638 (1945). In 1977, recognizing that radio networking had become comprised of only periodic and limited news and informational programming, the FCC repealed most of the original
chain broadcasting rules as they applied to radio, retaining them for television. See Report,
Statement of Policy, and Order, Review of Commission Rules and Regulatory Policies Con-
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The regulations were designed to limit the power of the three national networks: the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), then a subsidiary of
Radio Corporation of America,2 2 the Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
(CBS), then controlled by William S. Paley and Associates,2 3 and the Mutual Broadcasting System, Inc., then controlled by the Chicago Tribune and
R. H. Macy & Co. 24
The Commission accepted as a paramount policy objective the need for
government to foster "the fullest possible measure of competitive opportunity consistent with furnishing the public adequate broadcasting service." 2 5
It designed the chain broadcasting rules to end perceived anticompetitive
practices and to eliminate certain pro-network clauses in network affiliation
contracts.26
cerning Network Broadcasting by Standard (AM) and FM Broadcast Stations, 63 F.C.C.2d
674 (1977) (deleting 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.131, 73.133-.138, 73.231, 73.233-.238). The chain broadcasting rules have since been recodified and appear at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1987). The term
"chain broadcasting" appears in § 3(p) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(p)(1982), and is defined as the "simultaneous broadcasting of an identical program by
two or more interconnected stations." Id. The term "chain broadcasting" is now subsumed
within the modem regulatory definition of the terms "network" and "network organization"
in 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1987). Section 73.658(a) reads in pertinent part: "The term 'network
organization' as used in this section includes national and regional network organizations.... "
Id. § 73.658(a) (citation omitted). Section 73.658(j)(4), pertaining to network syndication and
program practices, provides that:
For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph (k) of this section the term network means any person, entity, or corporation which offers an interconnected program service on a regular basis for 15 or more hours per week to at least 25 affiliated
television licensees in 10 or more States; and/or any person, entity, or corporation
controlling, controlled by, or under common control with such person, entity, or
corporation.
Id. § 73.6580)(4).
Section 73.658(i)(1)(v) defines "network" as "a national organization distributing programs
for a substantial part of each broadcast day to television stations in all parts of the United
States, generally via interconnection facilities." Id. § 73.658(1)(1)(v). For a concise yet informative history of chain broadcasting, see NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMM., FINAL REPORT, NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS: ENTRY, JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION 11-2 to 11-13, 11-32 to 11-38 (1980)[hereinafter NETWORK ENTRY REPORT].

22. See 1941 CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 18, at 9. As of .1938, NBC had
161 affiliates, 10 licensed facilities of its own, and two national networks: the "Red" and the
"Blue." Id. at 15-16.
23. Id. at 21-22. As of 1938, CBS had 113 affiliates and eight licensed facilities of its own.
Id. at 23.
24. Id. at 26. As of 1939, Mutual had 107 affiliates. Id. at 27.
25. Id. at 47.
26. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Review of Rules and Policies Concerning Network Broadcasting by Television Stations; Elimination or Modification of Section 73.658(c) of
the Commission's Rules, FCC 89-89, adopted Mar. 16, 1989, released Apr. 7, 1989 (deleting
the rule in its entirety) [hereinafter Network Term Elimination NPRM].
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The Commission prohibited "network exclusivity," denying a license or
license renewal to any prospective or present licensee having an arrangement
with a network organization whereby the licensee agreed not to broadcast
the programming of any other network organization.2 7 The Commission
also prohibited "territorial exclusivity," denying a license or license renewal
to any prospective or present licensee having an arrangement with a network
organization whereby the network would agree not to permit its programming to be broadcast by any other station serving substantially the same
area.2 8 The Commission intended its network and territorial exclusivity
rules to encourage the networks to sell the programming rejected by their
affiliates to their affiliates' local competitors.2 9
The Commission also limited the term of network affiliation contracts to
two years.30 This rule was intended to encourage the development of new
networks. 3 1 The Commission also precluded networks from requiring
broadcast licensees to make available a broadcast day or time segment for
the mandatory carriage of network programming.3 2 This rule was designed
to promote the development of local programming services.33
Another provision prohibited network affiliation contracts that limited a
licensee's discretion to reject programming which the licensee deemed "un27. See 47 C.F.R. § 3.101 (1941), recodified at id.§ 3.631 (1945), current version at id.

§ 73.658(a) (1987).
28. See 47 C.F.R. § 3.102 (1941), recodified at id. § 3.632 (1945), current version at id.

§ 73.658(b) (1987).
29. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 199-201 (1943); see also 1941 CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 18, at 57, 59, 91; Cable Television Report and Order, Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to
Community Antenna Television Systems; Inquiry Into the Development of Communications
Technology and Services To Formulate Regulatory Policy and Rulemaking and/or Legislative
Proposals, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972) (currently codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76 (1987)) (establishing
syndicated exclusivity rules); Report and Order, Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980) (deleting 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.63, 76.151-76.161) (abolishing
the syndicated exclusivity rules); Report and Order, Amendment of Parts 73 and 76 of the
Commission's Rules Relating to Program Exclusivity in the Cable and Broadcast Industries, 3
FCC Rcd 5299 (1988) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.658, 76.5-76.163) (reimposing a modified form of program exclusivity rules); Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Amendment of Parts 73 and 76 of the Commission's Rules, Program Exclusivity in the Cable and
Broadcast Industries, 3 FCC Rcd 6171 (1988).
30. See 47 C.F.R. § 3.103 (1941), recodified at id. § 3.633 (1945), current version at id.
§ 73.658(c) (1987).
31. See NBC, 319 U.S. at 199; see also 1941 CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note
18, at 62, 91-92; supra note 26.
32. See 47 C.F.R. § 3.104 (1941), recodified at id. § 3.634 (1945), current version at id.
§ 73.658(d) (1987).
33. See NBC, 319 U.S. at 203; see also 1941 CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note
18, at 65, 92.
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satisfactory or unsuitable or contrary to the public interest.", 34 By this rule,
the Commission hoped to prevent its licensees from ceding to the networks
35
control over ultimate program decisionmaking.
The Commission prohibited the grant of any license to a network organization that already owned a broadcast station covering the same area to be
served by the new network-owned station, or that proposed service to a locality in which other existing stations would be competitively disadvantaged
to a substantial degree by the introduction of the new network-owned station.3 6 The FCC's purpose was to open the nation's "most powerful and
37
desirable" markets to other networks.
The chain broadcasting rules initially prohibited a broadcast station affiliate of a network organization that maintained more than one network from
obtaining a second broadcast license if there would be substantial overlap in
the territories served by the network-affiliated stations. However, within
months of promulgating this rule, the Commission suspended it indefinitely. 38 Although the rule was not imposed upon radio broadcast stations,
it was applied to television stations.39
The Commission also prevented the networks from requiring broadcast
licensees to establish advertising rates in accordance with the network's desired rates for non-network air time.' With this prohibition, the Commission sought to encourage competition between affiliates and the networks for
advertising accounts.4 1
Considered collectively, these rules were broadly prophylactic, designed
not to end specific instances of proven antitrust violations, but to prevent
possible future media concentrations. The Commission understood its au34. See 47 C.F.R. § 3.105 (1941), recodified at id. § 3.635 (1945), current version at id.

§ 73.658(e) (1987).
35. See NBC, 319 U.S. at 206; see also 1941 CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note
18, at 66, 92.
36. See 47 C.F.R. § 3.106 (1941), recodified at id. § 3.636 (1945), current version at id.
§ 73.658(f) (1987). This rule forced NBC to divest itself of "one of its two networks and one

station in each market where it operated two outlets." Howard, supra note 13, at 6. NBC sold
its "blue network" and some of its stations to candy manufacturer Edward J. Noble on Octo-

ber 12, 1943. Id. at 7. The NBC "blue network" later became the American Broadcasting
Company, more commonly known as ABC.

37. See NBC, 319
note 18, at 68-69.
38. See 47 C.F.R.
39. See 47 C.F.R.
40. See 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.658(h) (1987).

U.S. at 206-07; see also 1941 CHAIN BROADCASTING

REPORT,

supra

§ 3.107 (1941).
§ 3.637 (1945), current version at id. § 73.658(g) (1987).
§ 3.108 (1941), recodified at id. § 3.638 (1945), current version at id.

41. See NBC, 319 U.S. at 209; see also 1941 CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note
18, at 75, 92.
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thority to reach beyond the limits of the antitrust laws to practices having a
potential for undesirable concentration. The Commission explained:
While many of the network practices raise serious questions under
the antitrust laws, our jurisdiction does not depend on a showing
that they do in fact constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. It is
not our function to apply the antitrust laws as such. It is our duty,
however, to refuse licenses or renewals to any person who engages
or proposes to engage in practices which will prevent either himself
or other licensees or both from making the fullest use of radio
facilities. 42
The United States Supreme Court stamped this understanding with an imprimatur of constitutionality in NBC v. United States.43 NBC attacked on
first amendment grounds the Commission's assumption of sweeping authority to structure the broadcasting marketplace and dictate the business relationships of licensees. It argued that the chain broadcasting regulations
unduly restricted the free speech rights of licensees.' According to NBC,
the regulations constituted a pervasive intrusion into the business affiliations
and programming decisions of broadcasters, tantamount to unconstitutional
governmental control over licensed frequencies.45 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, rejected this argument. He concluded that the regulations
essentially consisted of conditions upon the grant of a license to use a finite
and unique public resource: the scarce electromagnetic spectrum, which
could be occupied by only a limited number of people. 46 Because the Commission had statutory authority to license uses of scarce spectrum according
to its conception of the public interest, it could constitutionally decide the
nature of those uses and the composition of spectrum users.4 7 Moreover,
because denial of a license under the chain broadcasting rules was not predicated upon illegitimate considerations such as the applicants' political, social, or economic views, but upon activities and associations which the
Commission believed to be inconsistent with the public interest, discrimination against those applicants, in Frankfurter's view, neither abridged their
free speech rights nor exceeded the Commission's statutory and constitutional authority.48 Despite the fact that the Commission based its regula42. 1941 CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 18, at 83.
43. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
44. Id. at 226.
45. See Lee, Antitrust Enforcement, Freedom of the Press, and the "Open Market". The
Supreme Court on the Structure and Conduct of Mass Media, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1319
(1979).
46. NBC, 319 U.S. at 226.
47. Id. at 226-27.

48. Id.
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tions upon little more than predictive judgment, with no evidence of actual
present or probable detriment to the public interest, the NBC decision encouraged the FCC to frequently resort to entry barriers as a means of countering perceived dangers of market concentration.4 9
2.

The Duopoly and One-to-a-Market Rules

Six months after the Court handed down its decision in NBC, the Commission adopted its first so-called "duopoly" rule. This rule prohibited any
licensee from owning a standard (AM) broadcast station in substantially the
same area as, and having overlapping primary service contours with, the
50
licensee's existing AM station.
In 1940, among its rules affecting the new FM and TV broadcast services,
the Commission included a proscription against duopoly ownership." Between 1940 and 1969, the Commission changed its duopoly rules only
once.52 In 1964, the Commission enacted more restrictive standards to govern prohibited duopoly ownership. Those standards prohibited ownership,
operation, or control of two AM or two FM stations in the same area if the
existing and predicted primary service contours of the stations overlapped. 53
49. See id. at 224. For an insightful critique of the NBC decision, see Lee, supra note 45,
at 1315-22.
50. See Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Stations, Multiple
Ownership of Standard Broadcast Stations, 8 Fed. Reg. 16,065 (1943) (currently codified at 47
C.F.R. § 73.3555(a) (1987)), amended by First Report and Order, Amendment of Section
73.3555, The Broadcast Multiple Ownership Rules, FCC 88-343 (Feb. 22, 1989). In Rules
Governing Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Stations, Multiple Ownership of Standard
Broadcast Stations, 9 Fed. Reg. 3860 (1944), the Commission required existing standard
broadcast licensees to divest themselves of stations held in violation of the new duopoly rule.
From 1938 to 1941, the FCC had employed a presumption against the grant of any new stan-

dard broadcast license that would produce an ownership duopoly. See Genesee Radio Corp., 5
F.C.C. 183, 186 (1938). A "cross-interest" policy developed in Commission precedent to extend the reach of the duopoly rules and prevent individuals from having "meaningful" interests as owners, officers, or managers "in two broadcast stations, or a daily newspaper and a
broadcast station, or a television station and a cable television system serving substantially the
same area." See Notice of Inquiry, Reexamination of the Commission's Cross-Interest Policy,
2 FCC Rcd 3699 (1987) [hereinafter Cross-Interest NOI].
51. 6 FCC ANN. REP. 68 (1940).
52. For a history of legislative and administrative proposals concerning ownership during

this period, see Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and
73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television
Broadcast Stations, 95 F.C.C.2d 360, 361-72 (1983)[hereinafter Seven-Station Modification

NPRM]; Howard, supra note 13, at 7-46.
53. Report and Order, Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 45 F.C.C. 1476 (1964) (currently codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a) (1987)), amended by
First Report and Order, Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules, The
Broadcast Multiple Ownership Rules, FCC 88-343 (Feb. 22, 1989).
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The Commission also prohibited ownership, operation, or control of two television stations in the same area if the existing and predicted secondary service contours of the stations overlapped.54
In 1970, the Commission amended its duopoly rules to prohibit future
interservice ownership in the same market: the so-called "one-to-a-market"
rule. This rule precluded existing AM, FM, and TV licensees from acquiring other broadcast facilities in other services in the same market." Specifically, the new rule prevented any radio licensee from acquiring a TV station
if the licensee's AM or FM station service contours encroached upon the
television station's community of license. 56 Similarly, the rules prevented
any television licensee from acquiring a radio station if the licensee's television primary service contours encroached upon the AM or FM station's
community of license. 5 7 In 1971, the FCC liberalized its initial exception to
its new rule by permitting AM-FM combinations in the same market and by
permitting existing radio licensees to acquire UHF stations in the same
market.5 8
3.

The Cross-InterestPolicy

In 1940, in an effort to extend the reach of the early duopoly rule, the
Commission began, on a case-by-case basis, to prohibit "cross-interests" in
the same service in the same market area. 59 The general purpose of the policy was to require individuals possessing attributable ownership interests in a
broadcast station to maintain arms' length relationships with other stations
54. Id.
55. First Report and Order, Amendment of Section 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast

Stations, 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970) (currently codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (1987), as
amended by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 662 (1971), amended by Second
Report and Order, Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules, The Broadcast
Multiple Ownership Rules, FCC 88-407 (Feb. 23, 1989) [hereinafter One-to-a-Market Report
and Order].
56. Id.
57. Id. The Commission excluded from consideration under the rule class IV AM stations in communities with populations under 10,000 by permitting such AM stations to own
FM stations in the same market, "provided the FM station was not serving the same market as
a commonly-owned television station." Howard, supra note 13, at 61. Daytime-only AM
station licensees were also permitted to own FM stations in the same market, provided the FM
did not serve the same market as a commonly owned television station. FM station licensees
were not afforded a similar rule exemption. Id.
58. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240 and
73.236 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 28 F.C.C.2d 662 (1971) (currently codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555
note 4 (1987)); One-to-a-Market Report and Order, supra note 55, at 306, 318-19.
59. See, e.g., Macon Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 444 (1945).

First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership

1989]

in the same area and service. The policy prohibited a station owner from
having a joint business relationship, with competing media in that owner's
market area, that had a potential for impairing competition.' Over time,
Commission decisions sanctioned an expansion in the policy to cover a wide
variety of positional cross-interests 61 and to extend to interservice crossinterests.6 2

4.

The Multiple Ownership Rules

In 1940, the Commission introduced another set of ownership regulations:
the multiple ownership rules. The first multiple ownership rules required a
single licensee who sought to own, operate, or control more than three television and six FM stations nationwide to prove that such ownership would
encourage competition. 63 In 1944, the Commission raised its three-station
limit in the television service to five stations." In its 1946 Sherwood B.
Brunton decision,65 the Commission denied a CBS application for an eighth
standard broadcast station, effectively creating a seven-station limit for the
AM service.66
In 1953, the Commission concluded a rulemaking initiated in 194867 by
60. See, e.g.. Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 19 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 1 (1959).
61. See, e.g., Martin Lake Broadcasting Co., 21 F.C.C.2d 180 (1970) (AM owners prohibited from serving as general manager and sales manager in another AM station in the same
market); Golden West Broadcasters, 16 F.C.C.2d 918 (1969) (advertising sales company with
ownership interest in one station prohibited from representing another station in same market
and same service), rev'd, Report and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 668, 682-83 (1981); Guy S. Erway, 48
Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 829 (Rev. Bd. 1980) (individual with managerial position at one station
prohibited from serving as consultant to other station in the same market).
62. See, e.g., Cleveland Television Corp. v. FCC, 732 F.2d 962, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(radio and television cross-interests prohibited); News International, PLC, 97 F.CC.2d 349
(1984) (cable television system and television station cross-interest prohibited); Lexington
County Broadcasters, Inc., 42 F.C.C.2d 581 (Rev. Bd. 1973); Macon Television Co., 43 F.C.C.
1173 (1952) (AM and FM station cross-interest prohibited).
63. See 47 C.F.R. § 4.226 (Supp. 1944); 47 C.F.R. § 3.640 (Supp. 1945); Rules Governing
Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Stations, Multiple Ownership of Standard Broadcast
Stations, 5 Fed. Reg. 2382, 2384 (1940), amended by 9 Fed. Reg. 5442 (1944), amended by
Report and Order, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953), amended by Report and Order, 43 F.C.C. 2797
(1954), amended by Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984), amended by Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 74 (1985) (currently codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)
(1987)).
64. Rules Governing Broadcast Services Other Than Standard Broadcast, Multiple Ownership, 9 Fed. Reg. 5442 (1944), amended by Sixth Report and Order, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953),
amended by Report and Order, 43 F.C.C. 2797 (1954), amended by Report and Order, 100
F.C.C.2d 17 (1984), amended by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 74 (1985)
(currently codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (1987)).
65. 11 F.C.C. 407 (1946).
66. See Seven-Station Modification NPRM, supra note 52, at 362.
67. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240, and 3.636 of
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adopting new multiple ownership rules that specified a seven FM, five TV,
and seven AM station limit.6" Although the Commission did not (and perhaps could not) adequately and precisely explain why its chosen numerical
limits were maximally conducive to either economic competition or viewpoint diversity, it proclaimed that these dual concerns were central underpinnings of the new rules.69

The Commission subsequently altered its

television station limitation to make adjustments for the slowly growing and
less desirable UHF service,7 ° by permitting a single individual or entity to
own, operate, or control a total of seven television stations, no more than five
of which could be VHF facilities. 7 '

5. The Top 50 Policy
In 1964, fearing ownership concentration in the nation's top television
markets, the Commission adopted an "interim top 50 policy." 7 2 This policy
required the Commission to conduct a hearing when presented with any applicant seeking a second VHF station in any of the top 50 markets. The
Commission permitted an exemption from its top 50 policy if the applicant
could meet a "compelling public interest" standard by showing that undue
concentration would not result from joint operation of the two VHF
stations.73

In 1965, the Commission recommended transforming its top 50 policy
the Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 13 Fed. Reg. 5060 (1948).
68. See Report and Order, The Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of the Rules
and Regulations Relating to the Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broadcasting
Stations, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953) (currently codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (1987)), amended
by Report and Order, 43 F.C.C. 2797 (1954), amended by Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17
(1984), amended by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 74 (1985) [hereinafter
Multiple Ownership Report and Order].
69. The Commission explained that it favored "diversification of ownership in order to
maximize diversification of program and service viewpoints as well as to prevent any undue
concentration of economic power contrary to the public interest." Id. at 292-93. In United
States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956), the Court determined that the FCC's
establishment of numerical ownership limits was a legitimate exercise of the Commission's
regulatory authority. Id. at 203-04.
70. Report and Order, Amendment of Section 3.636 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership of Television Broadcast Stations, 43 F.C.C. 2797
(1954) (currently codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (1987)), amended by Report and Order,
100 F.C.C-2d 17 (1984), amended by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 74
(1985).
71. Id.; see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.636(a)(2) (1979).
72. Public Notice, Commission to Designate for Hearing Applications to Acquire Inter-

ests in a Second VHF Station in Major Markets, 45 F.C.C. 1851 (1964).
73. Public Notice, Interim Policy Concerning Acquisition of Television Broadcast Stations, 5 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 271 (1965).
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into a new ownership rule that proscribed the acquisition of more than three
television stations or two VHF stations in any of the top 50 markets.7 4 In
1968, the Commission rejected the proposed rule, but issued a new top 50
policy that required each licensee seeking a fourth television station or a
third VHF station in any of the top 50 markets to meet a compelling public
interest standard for the proposed transfer, and to identify how the proposed
benefits of the transfer exceeded the diversity disadvantages." In 1979, the
Commission abandoned its top 50 policy, concluding that predictions of concentration of ownership had not come to pass, 76 despite the fact that every
requested waiver of the interim top 50 policy had been granted."
6

The Broadcast Television/CA TV System and the National Network!
CA TV System Cross-OwnershipRules

In 1970, the Commission adopted a rule prohibiting television broadcast
station owners from owning, operating, controlling, or having an interest in
a cable (CATV) system if that system's service area would overlap the station's predicted secondary service contour.78 In addition, the Commission
adopted a rule prohibiting the national television networks from owning,
operating, controlling, or having any interest in cable television systems.79
These two rules expanded the Commission's involvement in structuring the
marketplace to further its policy of diversity of control over communications
media.80 The Commission also adopted a series of rules prohibiting a telephone company from owning, operating, or controlling a cable television
74. Id. at 272.
75. Report and Order, Amendment of Section 73.636(a) of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of TV Broadcast Stations, 12 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1501 (1968),
repealed by Report and Order, 75 F.C.C. 2d 585 (1979).
76. Report and Order, Amendment of Section 73.636(a) of the Commission's Rules (Multiple Ownership of Television Stations), 75 F.C.C.2d 585 (1979), aff'd sub nom. NAACP v.
FCC, 682 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also L. POWE, JR., FCC DETERMINATIONS ON
NETWORKING ISSUES IN MULTIPLE OWNERSHIP PROCEEDINGS 60-72, 87-95 (Network Inquiry Special Staff, Preliminary Report on Prospects for Additional Networks) (1980).
77. See Howard, supra note 13, at 55.
78. See Second Report and Order, Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems; Inquiry
into the Development of Communications Technology and Services to Formulate Regulatory
Policy and Rulemaking and/or Legislative Proposals, 23 F.C.C.2d 816 (1970) (currently codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.501 (1987)) [hereinafter Second CATV Cross-Ownership Order]; see
also FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, POLICY ON CABLE OWNERSHIP 51-56 (Staff Report) (1981) [hereinafter POLICY ON CABLE OWNERSHIP]. The rule is also codified in the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 613, 98 Stat. 2779, 2785
(codified at 47 C.F.R. § 533(a) (Supp. III 1985)).
79. See Second CATV Cross-Ownership Order, supra note 78; see also POLICY ON CABLE
OWNERSHIP, supra note 78, at 107-24.
80. See Second CATV Cross-Ownership Order, supra note 78.
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system operating in its service area."'
7. The Newspaper-BroadcastCross-Ownership Rules
In 1975, the FCC adopted its newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership
rules.8 2 These rules banned the future acquisition of a broadcast station by
any individual or entity that owned, operated, or controlled a daily newspaper whose place of publication would be entirely encompassed by the primary AM, FM, or TV broadcast station's contours.8 3 The Commission
found these rules "in furtherance of [its] long standing policy of promoting
diversification of ownership of the electronic mass communications
media." 4
The Commission concluded that the prospective ban on cross-ownership
advanced the public interest, as reflected in its concept of the goal of the first
amendment: promoting dissemination of information from diverse viewpoints. 5 To avoid detrimental disruptions in service, the rules
"grandfathered" existing newspaper/broadcast combinations in the same
community, i.e., permitted their continued existence. 6 However, in communities where one owner held the only radio station and only newspaper,
or the only newspaper and only television station, the rules required the
owner to divest either the newspaper or the broadcast facility unless grounds
for waiver could be demonstrated. 7 In contrast to the prospective owner81. See Applications of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel
Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, 21 F.C.C.2d 307
(1970) (currently codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54-63.58 (1987)), aff'd sub nom. General Tel. Co.
v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971). These provisions have generally been codified
in the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 at 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1)-(4) (Supp. III
1985).

82. See Second Report and Order, Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard,
FM, and Television Stations, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975) (currently codified at 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.3555(c) (1987)), aff'd sub nom. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting
(NCCB), 436 U.S. 775 (1978) [hereinafter Second Newspaper-Broadcast Cross-Ownership Re-

port and Order].
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1048.
85. See id. at 1049, 1050-51; see also infra notes 198-212 and accompanying text (discussing Commission's positivist perspective of the first amendment).
86. Second Newspaper-Broadcast Cross-Ownership Report and Order, supra note 82, at
1049.
87. Id. at 1080-84. Temporary waivers of the divestiture rule may be granted, see, e.g.,
Metromedia Radio and Television, Inc., 102 F.C.C.2d 1334, 1353 (1985), aff'd sub nom.
Health and Medicine Policy Research Group v. FCC, 807 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1986), if the
owner can demonstrate that the facility would have to be sold at a distress price, if a broadcast
station and newspaper in the same locality cannot be supported under separate ownership, or if
the Commission concludes that the rule's purpose would be better served by continued joint

ownership. Second Newspaper-Broadcast Cross-Ownership Report and Order, supra note 82,
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ship ban, which expressed the Commission's first amendment policy objectives, the divestiture provision was aimed at avoiding undue economic
concentration by breaking up local8 media monopolies, and was fundamentally rooted in antitrust concerns. 8
Newspaper and broadcast owners challenged the rules on constitutional,
statutory, and procedural grounds. Upon review by the Supreme Court, the
first amendment issues involved the constitutionality of conditioning receipt
of a broadcast license on forfeiture of the right to publish a newspaper, and
upon the Commission's disparate treatment of newspaper owners as against
other broadcast license applicants.89 Broadcasters argued that the effect of
the rules was to restrict the speech of certain media owners in order to enhance the speech of other applicants.9"
As in NBC, the Supreme Court relied upon the "physical limitations" of
the broadcast media (spectrum scarcity), and the Commission's accepted
at 1085; see also News America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Permanent waivers are more difficult to obtain. Id. at 804; Field Communications Corp., 65
F.C.C.2d 959 (1977) (only instance in which the Commission has ever granted a permanent
waiver).
The waiver policy recently lay at the heart of an interesting controversy among media owner
Rupert Murdoch, Congress, and the Commission. An affiliate of News America Publishing,
Inc. had acquired television stations in Boston and New York, cities in which News America
owned newspapers. News America had obtained temporary waivers of the requirement that it
divest either the daily papers or the broadcast licenses in those cities. See Metromedia, 102
F.C.C.2d at 1353 (New York); Twentieth Holdings Corp., 1 FCC Red 1201 (1986) (Boston).
In January 1988, News America sought extensions of the waivers. News America, 844 F.2d at
804. However, in the FCC salaries and expenses provision of the continuing appropriations
legislation for fiscal year 1988, Congress buried an obscure provision forbidding the Commission from extending any "current grants" of temporary waivers. H.R. REP. No. 498, 100TH
CONG., IST SEss. 34 (1987). The only "current grants" in effect at that time were News
America's Boston and New York waivers. News America, 844 F.2d at 805. Before the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Murdoch challenged the law as
"uniquely discriminatory," in violation of the first and fifth amendments and the bill of attainder prohibition of the Constitution. Reviewing evidence of the amendment's sponsors' animus
against News America, which had petitioned the Commission for repeal of the newspaperbroadcast cross-ownership policy, see supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text, and Murdoch
personally, the court seemed unimpressed with News America's claims of focused congressional ill-will. News America, 844 F.2d at 810. It did, however, agree that the "Hollings
Amendment str[uck] at Murdoch with the precision of a laser beam," forbidding waiver extensions only to him, and not to any other prospective applicants. Id. at 814. Without a sufficiently close fit between the purported objectives of the amendment and the congressionally
chosen means, the provision was grossly underinclusive, denying Murdoch equal protection
under the law in violation of the Constitution. Id. at 815. The court vacated the Commission's order denying News America's requests for waivers. Id.
88. Second Newspaper-Broadcast Cross-Ownership Report and Order, supra note 82, at
1049.
89. See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting (NCCB), 436 U.S. 775, 798-802
(1978).
90. Id. at 799.
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power to choose the basis upon which to grant and deny broadcast licenses,
to uphold the regulations.9 1 Based on the authority of NBC and its progeny,
the Court was willing to subordinate the individual first amendment rights of
publishers to a systemic public interest in receiving diverse and antagonistic
viewpoints, while recognizing that such an approach would offend the Con92
stitution if applied to the print media.
&

The Regional Concentrationof Control Rule

93
In 1977, the FCC adopted its regional concentration of control rule.
This rule prohibited any licensee from owning, operating, or controlling
three broadcast stations if two of them were within 100 miles of the third
and the primary service contours of any two overlapped.94 The Commission
applied this rule prospectively to further its diversification policy.
These numerous regulations, which created legal barriers to entry into local media markets and delimited the overall intraservice and interservice
ownership potential of broadcast licensees, epitomize the FCC's regulatory
approach to attaining economic competition and viewpoint diversity. Without proof of specific antitrust violations or of a diminution in programming
choices, the FCC nevertheless has elected to circumscribe the right of broadcasters to exercise their freedoms of speech and press. The Commission has
implemented a general policy in favor of ownership diversity in the expectation that this policy best ensures maximal viewpoint diversity. Until recently, it has not attempted to determine if in fact its preference for single
rather than multiple broadcast station ownership has actually produced
more varied programming choices than would be present if market forces
were permitted to determine the programming presented. Under the currently prevailing marketplace approach to broadcast regulation,9 5 the Com-

91. Id. at 775.
92. Institutionalization of this view of the first amendment for the broadcast media fundamentally misconceives the role of the government in fostering free speech as envisioned by the
framers of the Constitution, as will be demonstrated infra in notes 287-361 and the accompanying text.
93. See Report and Order, Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast
Stations, 63 F.C.C.2d 824 (1977), repealed by Report and Order, 101 F.C.C.2d 402 (1984)
[hereinafter Regional Concentration of Control Report and Order]. In 1984, the Commission
abolished these rules. Report and Order, Repeal of the "Regional Concentration of Control"
Provisions of the Commission's Multiple Ownership Rules, 101 F.C.C.2d 402 (1984) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)-(f)) [hereinafter Regional Concentration of Control Repeal

Order].
94. Regional Concentration of Control Report and Order, supra note 93, at 828.
95. See generally Fowler & Brenner, A MarketplaceApproach to BroadcastRegulation, 60
TEX. L. REV. 207 (1982).
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mission has questioned its former assumption that government ownership
policies beget viewpoint diversity and has begun to prefer self-regulating
market forces as the best mechanism to promote a multiplicity of voices in
the marketplace of ideas.
B.

The DeregulatoryPhase

The movement away from structural barriers to market entry into broadcasting began in earnest in the late 1960's. In a 1969 study conducted for the
National Association of Broadcasters, George H. Litwin and William H.
Wroth offered proof that FCC efforts to maximize economic competition
and viewpoint diversity could, at times, be mutually exclusive. 96 The Litwin/Wroth study revealed that multiple-media owners generally afforded
the public more diverse news and informational programming than did single station owners. 97 The study found that multiple owners were less dependent upon wire services and the networks for programming than were singlestation owners, and that multiple owners tended to create more of their own
locally originated programming, in greater quantity and of higher quality,
than single station owners. 98 The Litwin/Wroth study questioned the
FCC's aversion to any form of media concentration and its ceaseless quest to
add new media owners to the marketplace. It warned that enhancing market competition could well come at the expense of programming quality and
viewpoint diversity.9 9
1. The Network Inquiry and Office of Plans and Policy Staff Reports
In 1980, the Commission's staff began to turn against the ownership rules.
In an exhaustive survey of the duopoly, one-to-a-market, regional concentration of control, and network practices rules, the Commission's Network Inquiry Special Staff (Special Staff) found that the forty years of FCC
ownership regulation had produced almost no public interest benefits10°
After a thorough assessment of the ownership rules' economic impact, the
Special Staff concluded that no causal nexus existed between the rules and
the goals of competition and viewpoint diversity that the rules were designed
to foster. 101
96. See G. LITWIN & W. WROTH, THE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP ON MEDIA
CONTENT AND INFLUENCE: A RESEARCH EVALUATION OF MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST
97. Id. at 9-1.

(1969).

98. Id. at 9-2.
99. Id.
100. NETWORK ENTRY REPORT, supra note 21.
101. The Network Inquiry Special Staff (Special Staff) wrote:
The Commission's rules respecting the number of communications outlets one firm
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The Special Staff also concluded that the chain broadcasting rules were
largely superfluous, adding nothing to the competitive environment.,o 2 Further, the Special Staff found that the Commission's own spectrum allocation

plan for television stood as the principal impediment to the addition of new
broadcast networks, noting that the "plan seriously handicaps a fourth and
additional networks by limiting their coverage and forcing them to affiliate
with UHF stations in markets with many viewers. '" 3 Moreover, the Special Staff found the Commission's concern about network dominance exag4

1
gerated and its appreciation of the value of networks inadequate. 0
The Special Staff's report generally recommended eliminating the ownership rules, even as they pertained to network ownership of cable facilities,

noting that feared concentration by broadcast networks seemed an unlikely
event given the cable television market position of such "large and highly
diversified firms ... as Time, Westinghouse, Hughes and Warner."',) 5 Over-

all, the Special Staff determined that continued reliance upon entry barriers
was a counterproductive exercise and that an unbridled market would be the
best means to fulfill Commission objectives of economic competition and
viewpoint diversity. The Special Staff encouraged the Commission to pro06
mote an open entry policy.
In 1981, the Commission's Office of Plans and Policy (OPP) issued a remay own within a single local market and, even more especially, its rules limiting the
number of television stations one firm may own throughout the nation are arbitrary
and capricious. They frequently impose uniform numerical limitations that have no
apparent relationship to the distinct conditions of competition and diversity among
the several services, and in the many markets, affected by these rules ....

As cur-

rently construed, these rules often may serve only to impair the realization of efficiencies in the use of television outlets. Certainly, they should not serve as a model for
Commission regulation of outlets employing new technologies.
Id. at 111-167.
102. The Special Staff stated flatly that the rules did "nothing to promote competition,"
had not given the public more viewing options, and did not foster the Commission's goal of
increased diversity. Id. at IV-47 to IV-48.
103. Id. at IV-3.
104. Id. at IV-21. The report stated:
[N]etworks perform ... important functions in the wider system of developing and
broadcasting television programs. More resources can be expended on program production if those costs are spread over a large number of outlets and viewers. More
funding for a national distribution system can be achieved if a national market in the
sale of commercial time is established. Television networks . . . are indispensable
organizers of a nationwide system of television broadcasting.
Id.
105. Id. at 111-159.
106. The Special Staff concluded that excessive government oversight hampered the ability
of the marketplace to respond flexibly to technology and consumer preferences, and that open
competition would operate more efficiently. Id. at 111-35.
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port entitled FCC Policy on Cable Ownership which reexamined the broadcast. television/CATV system and the national network/CATV system
cross-ownership rules.'" 7 The OPP staff concluded that both rules should be
rescinded in favor of reliance upon market forces, with resort to the antitrust
' 08
laws to "remedy those few situations lacking in competition."'
In stark contrast to its earlier regulatory days, the Commission now operated under a different set of assumptions. It had come to question the validity of its earlier view that market entry barriers would enhance viewpoint
diversity better than free market competition.l19 The Commission had also
come to regard a plethora of new media and a great expansion in the number
of radio and television outlets in local markets as rendering fears of harmful
concentration groundless. l" 0 The broad prophylactic prohibition against
broadcast television/CATV system joint ownership was said to disserve the
public interest in quality programming and, in some cases, in viewpoint diversity, without any provable corresponding public interest benefit."'
In its review of the Commission's ban on television network/CATV sys107. OFFICE OF PLANS AND POLICY, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM., FCC POLICY
ON CABLE OWNERSHIP (1981) (staff report) [hereinafter FCC CABLE OWNERSHIP POLICY].

108. Id. at 5.
109. Generally, the Commission had come to assume that the "marketplace approach" to
broadcast regulation would best serve the public interest. Chairman Mark Fowler's reorientation of the Commission shook the very foundations of the traditional trusteeship regulatory
model. Wrote Chairman Fowler:
Put simply, I believe that we are at the end of regulating broadcasting under the
trusteeship model. Whether you call it 'paternalism' or 'nannyism,' it is 'Big
Brother,' and it must cease.
I believe in a marketplace approach to broadcast regulation.... Under the coming marketplace approach, the Commission should, so far as possible, defer to a
broadcaster's judgment about how best to compete for viewers and listeners, because
this serves the public interest.
Fowler, The Public's Interest, 61 FLA. B. J. 213, 213 (1982); see also Fowler & Brenner, supra
note 95. In its report, the Office of Plans and Policy (OPP) recognized the Commission's dual
objectives of "increased competition in the economic marketplace" and "increased competition
in the marketplace of ideas." FCC CABLE OWNERSHIP POLICY, supra note 107, at 51 (citing
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Amendment of Part 74 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems; Inquiry into the Development of Communications Technology and Services to Formulate Deregulatory Policy and
Rulemaking and/or Legislative Proposals, 39 F.C.C.2d 377, 391 (1973)). However, the OPP
no longer assumed the propriety of regulatory structuring of either market, explaining:
"[W]hen markets are workably competitive, the two Commission goals are better served by
reliance on market forces than by Commission regulation." Id. The OPP determined that the
onus should be on the Commission to prove harms from market concentration rather than on
broadcast licensees to disprove harms. "[F]ree entry is an important element in a well-functioning market system; limitations on entry should be imposed (or maintained) only if it is
shown that substantial harm would result from entry." Id. at 51-52.
110. FCC CABLE OWNERSHIP POLICY, supra note 107, at 80.

111. Id. at 79-81.
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tern cross-ownership, the staff found the rules both unnecessary and inequitable.112 With dozens of cable networks in competition with the broadcast
networks, the OPP found it no longer necessary for the Commission to rely
1 13
upon its regulations to encourage the development of new networks.
The OPP realized that the viewing habits of the public were changing; an
increasing number of Americans were turning from broadcast to cable television. The report observed that, by not affording broadcast licensees an opportunity to diversify into cable in their local markets and by denying
television networks an opportunity to diversify into national cable markets,
the Commission could, in effect, be rendering broadcasters electronic dinosaurs, competitively disadvantaged in a new world of media abundance.1 14
In 1982, the OPP shifted its focus to the merits of the multiple ownership
rules in a staff report entitled Measurement of Concentration in Home Video
Markets.1 5 As it had in its 1981 report, the OPP accepted as its basic premise "that both economic competition and diversity are best viewed as
processes to be encouraged rather than results to be mandated., 116 The
OPP began to refine its earlier views on the benefits of economies of scale
and on the diminishing returns commensurate with a policy of advancing
diversity for diversity's sake.1 17 It found remiss the Commission's drive for
"perfect competition" through constant efforts to erect market entry barriers, explaining that as long as no single firm had control over consumer
choices, "workable competition" would suffice to prevent the perceived
harms of concentration."' The OPP,as it had in 1981, lauded many of the
by-products of multiple ownership as beneficial to the public, finding that
economies of scale derived from ownership concentration could result in
more varied and responsive programming.' 1 9
The OPP identified numerous means by which market entry, and there112. Id. at 180-82.

113. Id. at 116.
114. Id. at 179-82.

115. OFFICE OF PLANS AND POLICY, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, MEASUREMENT OF CONCENTRATION IN HOME VIDEO MARKETS (1982) (staff report) [hereinafter FCC
CONCENTRATION REPORT]. For an overview of staff action during this period, see Davis,
Eliminating the Network/Cable Cross-OwnershipBan: Does a Free Market Protect the Marketplace of Ideas?, 6 HASTINGS J. COMM. & ENT. LAW 163 (1983).
116. FCC CONCENTRATION REPORT, supra note 115, at iii.

117. "[D]iversity has costs as well as benefits," explained the OPP, "simple maximization
of diversity is not an appropriate goal."- Id. at 10. While the OPP found "diversity of ownership" an important goal, it noted that "when several independent outlets are available, additional ones may add little to diversity." Id.
118. Id.at 13 (citing Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON.
REV. 241-56 (1940)); see also id. at 32 ("[lIt appears that neither economic competition nor
diversity of viewpoints is necessarily well served by maximum fragmentation of ownership.").

119. Id. at 55.
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fore competition, had become possible through the advent of new technologies. These technologies, including subscription video services, cable
television, subscription television, multipoint distribution service, low power
television, satellite master antenna television systems, direct broadcast satellites, videocassette recorders, and videodisc players, augmented competition
from existing media consisting of AM and FM radio, UHF and VHF television, newspapers, magazines, books, motion pictures, live theater productions, and phonograph records. 1 20 Opportunities to acquire sufficient
market concentration to attain viewpoint predominance in this competitive
environment seemed remote. Following a conservative study of the program
distribution markets for television and cable, the Commission's staff found
"the national video market" to be "extraordinarily unconcentrated."''
Based primarily upon these reassessments of policy, the Commission commenced a deregulation program that continues to this day.
2. The Movement Toward Elimination of the National Network/CATV
System Cross-OwnershipRule
The first movement toward translating the OPP's conclusions into policy
occurred on August 27, 1982, when the Commission released a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking concerning the national network/CATV system
cross-ownership rule.' 2 2 The Notice proposed deletion of the rule, challenging its basic assumptions and noting that "changes in the video marketplace
that have occurred ...3 and will occur" rendered the rule unnecessary and
2
counterproductive.
The Commission identified three "basic beliefs" as the foundation for the
rules: that the networks would supply less desirable programming to their
own cable systems in order to maintain their broadcast audience; that network-owned cable systems would hamper development of new cable networks by refusing to carry programming supplied by competing networks;
and that networks would limit diversity by expanding their already dominant market positions as television suppliers. 124 In proposing deletion of the
rule, the Commission repudiated each of these assumptions.
The Commission identified no economic incentives for the networks to
120. Id. at 41-42.

121. Id. at 90.
122. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Amendment of Part 76, Subpart J, Section
76.501 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to Elimination of the Prohibition
on Common Ownership of Cable Television Systems and National Television Networks, 91

F.C.C.2d 76 (1982).
123. Id. at 81-82.
124. Id. at 82.
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restrict diversity on cable television systems they might come to own in order to maximize broadcast television viewing. 125 Rather, the FCC found the
cable industry highly 6 competitive, with programming diversity integral to
12
cable's profitability.
The Commission now viewed its second assumption, that entry into cable
would afford these networks power to restrict market entry by new networks, as questionable in light of the existence of significant obstacles to
horizontal integration within the cable marketplace due to the industry's
"persistent lack of concentration. '
In addition, the Commission found
that the multichannel nature of cable required cablecasters to consider a full
range of alternative network programming in order to present enough channel viewing options to satisfy consumer demand. 12' The Commission observed that the cable marketplace was filled, not with a large number of
marginal concerns, but with a "multiplicity of established cable networks,
often operated by very substantial firms" that would "act ... as yet another
barrier to any attempt which network cross-owners might make to dominate
'
the cable networking business." 129
As for the assumption that network ownership of cable would lead to a
reduction in programming diversity, the Commission now suspected that
some concentration of ownership could permit capital accumulation that
would foster a greater quantity of video programming. 3 ' The Commission
now assumed that economies of scale in the marketplace would enhance
13
viewpoint diversity rather than diminish it. 1
On September 6, 1988, six years after its initial Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in this proceeding, the Commission issued a Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking. 132 In this Further Notice, the Commission relied
upon the findings of a recent National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA) report 13 3 to conclude that changes in the video mar125. Id.
126. Only if the networks "were to achieve a position of dominant multiple system ownership" would there be a likelihood of intentional anticompetitive practices. Id. at 84-85. Given
"the historically unconcentrated nature of the [cable] industry," the Commission perceived
little chance of harmful concentration developing. Id. at 85.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 86.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Amendment of Part 76, Subpart J, Section
76.501 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations to Eliminate the Prohibition on Common
Ownership of Cable Television Systems and National Television Networks, 3 FCC Rcd 5283
(1988) [hereinafter Further CATV-Network NPRM].

133.

NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,

NTIA
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ketplace warranted further reappraisal of the rule. Specifically, the Commission explained that "evidence of a growing concern that cable may now be
the dominant video medium vis a vis broadcast television in many markets"
established further grounds for concluding that "continuation of the ownership restrictions may be counterproductive to the public interest," actually
"limiting competition for control of local outlets and imposing costs on the
public in terms of potential lost efficiencies that might be realized by vertical
134
integration."
3.

The PartialElimination of the Multiple Ownership Rules

On October 20, 1983, the Commission took its first major step toward a
rollback of the multiple ownership rules. On that date, it issued a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking seeking public comment on a proposal to "modify"
135
the then-existing "seven station rule."
The Commission extrapolated from empirical data in the trade press and
its on-air station tallies to document a 466% increase in the number of operating television stations, a 92% increase in the number of operating AM
stations, and a 561% increase in the number of operating FM stations, since
the promulgation of the "seven station" rule in 1953.136 It found that these
increases, together with projected electronic media growth, suggested "that
the potential for such national ownership concentration as would tend to
monopoly or threaten diversity is far less a matter of concern today than
might have been the case in 1953 and earlier years. "137
The Commission found the seven station rule arbitrary in its application,
creating the same barriers to ownership for multiple owners in certain
smaller markets nationwide, where no possibility for harmful concentration
existed, as it did in certain larger markets nationwide, where a potential for
harmful concentration was thought to exist. 138 The Commission indicated
that with the passage of time and technological development, the seven sta139
tion rule had become a relic.
On August 3, 1984, the Commission issued its Report and Order in the
seven station rule proceeding." 4 The Commission eliminated the rule and
REPORT No. 88-233, VIDEO PROGRAM DISTRIBUTION AND CABLE TELEVISION: CURRENT
POLICY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1988).

134.
135.
136.
137.

Further CATV-Network NPRM, supra note 132, at 5283.
Seven-Station Modification NPRM, supra note 52.
Id. at 373-74.
Id. at 376.

138. Id. at 381.
139. Id. at 382.
140. Report and Order, Amendment of Section 73.3555, of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 17
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replaced it with an interim twelve station rule that was to remain in effect
until 1990, at which time it would be automatically rescinded.14 ,
Based upon numerous formal comments, the Commission decided that
the rule had failed to effect any discernable increase in local market viewpoint diversity. 142 It found that "group owners do not impose monolithic
viewpoints on local media outlets"' 14 3 and that "group owners may be able to
devote more resources to newsgathering and other activities which improve
the quality of programming presented."'"
As to the economic competitiveness objective of the rule, the Commission
found that the seven station rule did not foster more competition in local
markets. 45 Applying the U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines
(i.e., the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) in order to test market concentration, the Commission concluded that low levels of concentration were pres146
ent in the national broadcast media marketplace.
Within days of the Report and Order's issuance, several congressmen requested that the Commission suspend implementation of the rule changes
pertaining to multiple ownership of television stations. 14 7 Responding to
this pressure, the Commission unilaterally stayed the effectiveness of its order until the date when review on reconsideration had been completed or
April 1, 1985, whichever occurred later.148 Congress also enacted a morato49
rium on implementation of the Report and Order.
On February 1, 1985, the Commission completed its reconsideration and
released its Memorandum Opinion and Order.'
In that document, the
Commission confirmed the conclusions underlying its Report and Order. ' 5'
(1984) (currently codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (1987)) [hereinafter Seven-Station Modification Report and Order].
141. Id. at 54-55; see also Gardner, December 19, 1984-A Big Day in Telecommunications, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 625, 629 (1985) (discussing merger activity planned by certain
multiple owners in anticipation of the relaxation of the seven station rule).
142. Seven-Station Modification Report and Order, supra note 140, at 19.
143. Id. at 37.
144. Id. at 38.
145. Id. at 42.
146. Id. at 42-43.
147. See Order, Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules Relating to
Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F)
887 (1984).

148. Id.
149. Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 98-396, § 304, 98 Stat. 1369,
1423 (1984).
150. Memorandum Opinion and Order, Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations,
100 F.C.C.2d 74 (1985) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (1987)).
151. Id. at 76.
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Perhaps due to expressions of congressional disfavor with abandonment of
the policy, however, it withdrew several of its proposed regulatory changes
and even adopted some new regulations. The Commission deleted the sixyear sunset provision of the new twelve station rule.' 5 2 It added a new regulation to prohibit multiple ownership of television stations that would afford
the multiple owner in question access to more than twenty-five percent of the
national audience, calculated as a percentage of all Arbitron Area of Dominant Influence (ADI) television households.' 5 3 To promote UHF development, the Commission ordered that UHF station owners be attributed with
only fifty percent of their actual ADI audience reach.' 54 Finally, to advance
its minority ownership policies, it excepted group owners having at least two
minority-controlled stations from the twelve station limit, permitting them
to own fourteen total stations in a single service.'" The new twelve station
rule remains unchanged as of the date of this writing.
4.

The Elimination of the Regional Concentration of Control Rules

On May 1, 1984, the Commission eliminated its regional concentration of
control rule.' 5 6 Finding that the "dramatic growth in the number and variety of media outlets" automatically enhanced viewpoint diversity and economic competition, the Commission could identify no justification for
maintaining restrictions on regional multiple ownership. 5 7 The competitiveness of regional media markets was found to be such that regional multiple ownership would not likely permit owners to attain "sufficient economic
power to permit anticompetitive behavior." 15 8 Consequently, the rule was
abolished. 5 9
5. The Relaxation of the Duopoly and One-to-a-Market Rules
On February 20, 1987, the Commission released a Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, advocating "relaxation" of the rule prohibiting overlap of the
broadcast contours of co-owned commercial AM and FM stations in the
same broadcast service and of the rule prohibiting common ownership of
commercial radio and television stations in the same market. 6
152. Id. at 96.
153. Id. at 90-91.
154. Id. at 93.
155. Id. at 94.

156. Regional Concentration of Control Repeal Order, supra note 93.
157. Id. at 408-10.
158. Id. at 410.

159. Id. at 416.
160. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's
Rules, The Broadcast Multiple Ownership Rules, 2 FCC Rcd 1138 (1987).
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The Commission chronicled the history of growth in broadcast outlets
and in the new communications technologies.'
In particular, it noted the
extent to which growth in media outlets had become not merely a phenomenon restricted to the largest markets, but one affecting large and small markets alike.' 62 "Under these circumstances," explained the Commission' "we
do not see the need for continuing to apply restrictions on radio-television
cross-ownership in these markets where there appears to be an abundance of
163
competition and viewpoint diversity."'
Furthermore, the Commission found common ownership in local markets
beneficial. Salary cost savings of as much as 35% and programming cost
savings in excess of 30% (due to simulcasting) could enable broadcast licensees to invest in better program service."' The Commission also noted that
without one-to-a-market impediments to joint ownership, financially sound
licensees could activate vacant commercial UHF and VHF television channels or could keep troubled television stations on the air.165 Last, the Commission expressed its confidence that common ownership could enhance
program diversity as a result of the common owner's greater resources. 166
On February 22, 1989, the Commission issued Reports and Orders modifying its duopoly and one-to-a-market local concentration rules. 167 The
Commission changed the geographic scope of the proscription on common
ownership of two or more commercial radio stations in the same service.
Under the old duopoly rule, same-service common ownership was impermissible if the two stations' primary service contours overlapped. Under the
new rule, same-service common ownership would only be impermissible if
the two stations'principalcity contours overlapped. 6 The Commission accepted the rationale articulated in its 1987 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
169
as the basis for the rule changes.
161. Id. at 1140.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1140-41.
165. Id. at 1141.

166. Id.
167. First Report and Order, Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commissions Rules,
The Broadcast Multiple Ownership Rules, FCC 88-343 (Feb. 22, 1989) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. § 73.35559(a)) [hereinafter Duopoly Report and Order]; Second Report and Order,
Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules, FCC 88-407 (Feb. 23, 1989) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b)) [hereinafter Second One-to-a-Market Report and Order].
168. Duopoly Report and Order, supra note 167, at 1.
169. Id. at 3-5. In its 1989 Duopoly Report and Order, supra note 167, the FCC, while still
adhering to its dual economic and viewpoint diversity goals, found that the growth of media
outlets, the benefits of common ownership attendant to economies of scale, and the profound
lack of concentration in local media markets justified relaxation of the radio duopoly rule. In
particular, the Commission concluded that "the potential risks of undue concentration are far

1989]

First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership

In modifying the one-to-a-market rule, the Commission introduced a new
waiver policy applicable in certain circumstances. The new policy, adopted
in light of the FCC's growing recognition of a lack of concentration in local
broadcast media markets, and that the scale economies of common radiotelevision ownership could result in better service, affords "favorable" review
to rule waiver requests from licensees in the top twenty-five markets, or, in
the existence of
other markets, to those licensees which can17demonstrate
"failed" broadcast stations in those markets. 0
6

The Movement Toward Deregulation of the Chain
Broadcasting Rules

On September 23, 1988, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rule
Making advocating the abolition of the term of affiliation rule, a minor aspect of the chain broadcasting rules that limits the terms of television broadcast affiliation contracts to two years. 17 ' The Commission expressed its view
that the rule had not fulfilled, but instead72 had hampered, promotion of the
development of new national networks. 1
In particular, the Commission expressed its belief that deletion of the rule
"may serve to strengthen the network-affiliate system" at a time when the
broadcast networks are losing their market shares to the burgeoning new
media technologies. 17 3 The Commission also perceived potential benefits in
contracts of longer duration, including the possibility of extended financial
planning by both new and existing networks.' 7 4
7. The Relaxation of the Cross-Interest Policy
On June 5, 1987, the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry concerning
less from a competition standpoint than they may have been in 1964 when the current version
of the radio duopoly rule was adopted .... Id. at 5 (emphasis added). However, the Commission continued to recognize that "potential" risk rather than actual incidents of anticompetitive behavior would concern it: "Our concerns in this area have not been based on any
evidence that group ownership would necessarily lead to anticompetitive practices in local
markets . . . but upon the potential for such practices to occur." Id. at 2. The FCC thus
continues to impose regulatory restrictions absent any proof of harm from common ownership.
Even under the intermediate scrutiny constitutional standard currently applicable to broadcast
regulation, see supra note 17, the entire complex of prophylactic structural regulation, which is
based on "phantom harm," appears vulnerable to a first amendment challenge. See Quincy
Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1985); infra note 284 (discussing Quincy).
170. Second One-to-a-Market Report and Order, supra note 167, at 11 & n.82.
171. See Network Term Elimination NPRM, supra note 26; see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(c)
(1987). On Apr. 7, 1989, the commission issued a Report and Order abolishing the term of
affiliation role. See supra note 26.
172. Network Term Elimination NPRM, supra note 26, at 5683.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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its Cross-Interest Policy.175 The Commission found, inter alia, that the "ad
hoc nature of the policy" caused by case-by-case adjudication rendered it
"uncertain and unpredictable."' 7 6 The Commission also found the policy to
impose "significant costs on our regulatees,"'" for it precluded transactions
that presented no real "threat to competition,"' 78 but could enhance economies of scale in station operation. 79
' The Commission found the competitive
broadcast market sufficiently vigorous to permit greater reliance upon unchecked market forces as a self-regulating, pro-competitive mechanism."°
in a Policy Statement released February 28, 1989, the Commission eliminated its cross-interest policy as it pertained to consulting arrangements,
time brokerage arrangements, and advertising agencies.'
However, the
Commission retained the policy as it pertained to "joint ventures," "key employees," and "nonattributable equity interests," preferring to address these
areas in a simultaneously issued Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
with a view toward a possible new blanket rule to replace the case-by-case
adjudicatory approach.' 8 2
The Commission reduced the scope and applicability of the rule because it
believed an abundance of media services and viewpoints in the marketplace
of ideas stripped the rule of its full legitimacy and warranted the creation of
a more narrowly tailored rule.
8.

The Petition to Repeal the Newspaper-Broadcast
Cross-OwnershipRules

On November 6, 1987, the Freedom of Expression Foundation (FEF), a
private membership corporation consisting of publishers of daily newspapers, broadcast licensees, print and broadcast trade associations, and other
corporate entities, 183 petitioned the Commission to conduct a rulemaking
175. Cross-Interest NOI, supra note 50.
176. Id. at 3700.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 3701.
179, Id.
180. Id. at 3701-02.
181, Policy Statement, Reexamination of the Commission's Cross-Interest Policy, MM
Docket No. 87-154 (FCC, released Feb. 28, 1989).
182. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Reexamination of the Commission's CrossInterest Policy, MM Docket No. 87-154 (FCC, released Feb. 28, 1989).
183. Media entrepreneur Rupert Murdoch's News America, Inc., is a member of the Freedom of Expression Foundation (FEF). News America also filed separate comments in support
of the FEF petition and was the petitioner in News America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d
800 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
invalidated Congress' recent attempt to remove the FCC's authority to extend Murdoch's temporary waivers of the newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership rule which permitted Murdoch to
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proceeding to repeal the newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership rule."8 4 FEF
contended that continued enforcement of the rule was unwarranted because
the rule's stated goal of promoting media diversity had been achieved. 18 5
Under these circumstances, the rules' effect of forcing broadcasters and
newspaper owners to choose only one medium of expression in a particular
market was an intrusion into their rights of free expression, unsupported by
a substantial government interest, and therefore unconstitutional."8 6 The
petition is still pending before the Commission.
II.

THE COMMISSION'S FAILURE TO EXTEND THE SYRACUSE PEACE
COUNCIL RATIONALE FROM THE CONTENT TO THE
STRUCTURAL REGULATORY CONTEXT

The preceding regulatory history chronicles the Commission's extensive
action in the 1980's toward delimiting or eliminating the barriers to market
entry it had so painstakingly erected for over forty years. However, in all its
deregulatory efforts, the Commission has not written one word concerning
the constitutional validity of its structural regulations. While the Commission has justified its substantial rollback of ownership restrictions by acknowledging that the rules have contributed little toward accomplishment of
its primary regulatory goals, promotion of viewpoint diversity and economic
competition, it has yet to begin questioning the first amendment implications
87
of those conclusions.1
This has not been the case with content-based regulations. In Syracuse
Peace Council, the Commission repudiated spectrum scarcity as a legitimate
basis for regulating the content of broadcast programming. 188 It discovered
a changed media marketplace, one replete with an enormous number of media outlets and a large variety of voices. The Commission found the spectrum scarcity rationale, deemed constitutional in NBC and its progeny, to be
not only obsolete in light of these changes, but an unreasonable basis upon
which to limit the free speech rights of broadcasters. Yet, through either an
excess of political caution or sheer inertia, the Commission has not acted
hold newspapers and broadcast stations in New York and Boston. Id. at 815; see supra note 87
(discussing News America case).

184. See Petition of Freedom of Expression Found. for Rulemaking, RM-6155 (FCC Nov.
6, 1987).
185. Comments of Freedom of Expression Found. in Support of Petition for Rulemaking,
RM-6155, at 10-15 (FCC Dec. 30, 1987).
186. Id. at 16-17.
187. See Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (FCC's "mere

abstract assertion of a government interest is insufficient to justify the subordination of First
Amendment freedoms"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
188. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text; see also infra note 247.
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upon this realization in the context of structural regulations even though the
very same scarcity rationale serves as the constitutional foundation for FCC
ownership restrictions.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in NBC marks the genesis in constitutional
jurisprudence of the questionable premise that the unique characteristics of
the broadcast medium, i.e., spectrum scarcity, justify a more expansive government regulatory role than would ever be countenanced for any other medium of expression. 89 Notably, although this rationale was later exported
to the programming content regulation context in Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC to uphold the authority of the Commission to determine what
will be said on a licensed frequency, its theoretical roots lie in NBC's affirmance of the Commission's means of selecting who will be permitted to use the
broadcast medium. NBC stands as the bulwark upon which the Commission's entire edifice of structural regulation is constructed. It established the
constitutionality of the Commission's authority to enforce viewpoint diversity by erecting barriers to entry into broadcasting.
From the start, Justice Frankfurter's melding in NBC of the constitutional
issues surrounding the chain broadcasting rules to the legitimacy of Commission decisions to grant or deny licenses was an exercise in misleading
reductionism. 90 The Court has consistently compounded this error by upholding other ownership regulations under the same rationale, thereby accreting additional precedent upon a shaky constitutional foundation.
In FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (NCCB),191 the
Court expounded upon the constitutionality of a particularly intrusive set of
FCC ownership regulations: the newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership
rules. The Court understood the constitutionality of the Commission's entire ownership diversification policy to be an outgrowth of the spectrum
scarcity rationale upheld in NBC. The crux of the NCCB decision was the
Court's recognition that, so long as spectrum scarcity remained the constitutional predicate for regulation according to the Commission's concept of the
"public interest" generally, there could be no question as to the constitutionality of the FCC's policy of enforcing ownership diversification.
The Court saw no inconsistency with free speech values in the fact that
the FCC's ownership restrictions established a favored class of speakerthose with no other media interests-and forced newspaper owners wishing
to use a broadcast frequency in their community to forfeit their right to
189. See infra notes 195-220 and accompanying text (describing the scarcity rationale).
190. See Kalven, Broadcasting,Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. & ECON.
15, 37 (1967); Lee, supra note 45, at 1320.
191. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
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publish. Again referring to the "unique characteristics" of the broadcast
media, the Court noted that the ownership regulations were not related to
192
the content of speech.
Yet the entire system of ownership regulations proceeds from the Commission's unsubstantiated presumption of a close nexus between the identity
of the broadcaster and the viewpoints expressed by that broadcaster through
his choice of programming.19 3 If regulation in the public interest justifies the
promotion of desirable viewpoints through restricting ownership of broadcast facilities by those with other mass media interests, the claim that such
regulations are not "content-based" ignores their fundamental purpose. 9 4
Having eschewed spectrum scarcity as a basis for the content-based Fairness Doctrine in Syracuse Peace Council, the Commission must now recognize that the questionable validity of the rationale which caused it to deem
regulatory limitations on what may be said to be unconstitutional must compel the Commission to deem regulatory limitations on who may speak to be
unconstitutional. Lack of a uniform extension of Syracuse Peace Council's
fundamental premise cannot be maintained forever if the Commission is to
avoid arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking. Rather, the Commission
and the courts should explicitly recognize that the repudiated scarcity rationale can no longer serve as a foundation for ownership regulations.
III.

SPECTRUM SCARCITY AND THE

FCC's

CONSTITUTIONAL

IMPERATIVE OF VIEWPOINT DIVERSITY IN
BROADCAST MEDIA

Premised solely upon the supposedly limited nature of usable spectrum,
the Supreme Court has permitted federal governmental restraints upon the
rights of broadcasters to communicate via the radio wave. The government
need only submit proof that such restrictions are "narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest"' 9 5 for the regulation to pass muster

under the first amendment. By contrast, the Court broadly prohibits governmental restraints on journalists' use of the print medium.' 96 Without
192. Id. at 800-01.
193. See infra notes 213, 215-16 and accompanying text.
194. See News America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that Supreme Court and commentators "recognize ambiguities in the content/structure

dichotomy").
195. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984).
196. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); see also
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public
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precisely analyzing the similarities and dissimilarities inherent in the print
and broadcast modes of communication, the Court has nevertheless determined that, generally speaking, "[d]ifferences in the characteristics of news
media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to
them. ' 197 NBC established that the first amendment is abridgeable in the
broadcast context because "[u]nlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all."19 Conceptually, spectrum scarcity has at least
two permutations: physical scarcity and economic scarcity. The Court has
identified "physical limitations" and "economic limitations" in the broadcast media 1 99 which cause "the broadcast media [to] pose unique and special
problems not present in the traditional free speech case. ''2"° On the basis of
these purported differences, the Court has determined that in the broadcast
context "regulation... may be permissible where similar efforts to regulate
the print media would not be."2 °1
Proponents of the scarcity-based regulatory regime allege that laissez-faire
allocation of frequencies will result in permanent exclusion of many who
wish to use the medium2 "2 or will result in a cacophonous collision of voices
on the airwaves. 20 3 Technical and market forces necessarily limit opportunities for speech. Economic scarcity, it is said, makes frequencies costly, denying access to all but the wealthy. The physical scarcity of available
frequencies makes it possible to avoid undesirable interference only by auofficials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and
judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial
process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press
as they have evolved to this time.
Id.; cf. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)
(commercial speech receives a lesser degree of first amendment protection).
197. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
198. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
199. In FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting (NCCB), 436 U.S. 775 (1978),
the Court summarized its long-established rationale for the disparate treatment of the broadcast and print media:
Because of problems of interference between broadcast signals, a finite number of
frequencies can be used productively; this number is far exceeded by the number of
persons wishing to broadcast to the public. In light of this physical scarcity, Government allocation and regulation of broadcast frequencies are essential, as we have
often recognized.
Id. at 799.
In Red Lion, the Court seemed to find economic scarcity, i.e., the higher marginal cost
associated with a less than universally available good, to create cause for regulation. In dicta,
the Court noted that "[o]nly a tiny fraction of those with resources and intelligence can hope
to communicate by radio." 395 U.S. at 388.
200. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49-50 n.55 (1976).
201. NCCB, 436 U.S. at 800.
202. See, e.g., FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940).
203. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940).
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thorizing one entity to operate upon a single frequency at a single time in a
single area.
These forms of scarcity present in the broadcast media are said to stigmatize broadcasting with "unique and special problems." 2" At root, these are
problems of access. The need to establish a basis upon which to choose
among the many wishing to use this powerful medium has resulted in circumscription of speakers' traditional rights to communicate freely. Under
the Communications Act of 1934, these essentially subjective judgments are
made according to the Commission's concept of the "public interest"."
Under the rubric of scarcity, the Commission's concept of the public interest has embraced a perspective of the first amendment that subordinates the
traditional need for protection of the individual speaker's unabridgeable
right to utter his favored views to a systemic need to guarantee to the listening and viewing public the "widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources." 2" Sanctioning this positivist approach, the Court has found that "[i]t is the [constitutional] right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."2 °7 Therefore, only in the broadcast context is "the Government
permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should
be expressed in this unique medium."2 The Commission's ownership regulations-indeed, its entire regulatory program-manifest this affirmative
constitutional imperative by expressing two overarching goals: the attainment of viewpoint diversity and economic competition in the broadcasting
marketplace, with both accomplished by discouraging ownership
concentration.
A.

The Viewpoint Diversity Component

Red Lion not only made the rights of viewers and listeners paramount to
the rights of speakers in the broadcast context; it also defined as a part of this
superior "right to hear" a corresponding right to viewpoint diversity. The
Court has recognized this approach as constitutional, finding that "the purpose of the First Amendment" was "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace
of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail." 2 °9 However, the Court
found protection of that marketplace of ideas not to require a prohibition of
204. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973).
205. See 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982).
206. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting (NCCB), 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978)
(quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
207. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
208. Id.
209. Id.
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state involvement in the free exercise of speech, but to mandate an affirmative state obligation to ensure "the right of the public to receive suitable
access to social, political, aesthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences." 2 ' The Court, in complicity with the Commission, has thereby
transformed the first amendment in the broadcast context from the guardian
of a marketplace of ideas into the guarantorof a marketplace of ideas. The
FCC has traditionally fulfilled this constitutional mandate in favor of viewpoint diversity through regulations promoting diversification of ownership,
presuming that each new broadcast media owner will add a different voice to
the marketplace of ideas.
B. The Economic Competition Component
In addition to the "viewpoint diversity" component, the Commission's
concept of the public interest, as reflected in its barriers to entering the
broadcast marketplace, demands a "maximum diffusion of control of the
media of mass communications. "211 The Commission advances this objective by structuring the market so as to achieve a maximum level of competition. 212 In one sense, measures to assure maximum levels of competition
operate to advance the goal of viewpoint diversity, for the Commission has
historically presumed a close nexus between maximum ownership diversity
and maximum viewpoint diversity.21 ' The Supreme Court in NCCB, while
210. Id.
211. West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985). This presumption has been recognized as dubious by the Commission itself in its Network Inquiry Report. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Telegraph Herald, 8 F.C.C. 322, 324 (1940). Competition and deconcentrated ownership is thought to promote improvements in the quality of broadcast service.
"[C]ompetition between stations in the same community inures to the public good because
only by attracting and holding listeners can a broadcast station successfully compete for advertisers." Id. (quoting Spartanburg Advertising Co., 7 F.C.C. 498 (1939)).
213. See Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Diversification seeks not
only to avoid undue concentration of media outlets in the hands of a few individuals or entities,
but also to promote diversity of programming and viewpoint.").
The Commission's presumed nexus between ownership diversity and viewpoint diversity is
fictive or exceedingly tenuous and of almost no utility. This understanding is apparently
shared by D.C. Circuit Judges Silberman and MacKinnon. In separate opinions in a case that
marks the first movement toward expansion of the Syracuse Peace Council rationale to the
structural regulatory context, these judges recently noted that market forces, as opposed to the
ownership composition of licensees, principally determine programming content decisions.
See, e.g., Shurberg Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, No. 84-1600, slip op. at 42-43, 50 (D.C. Cir.
March 31, 1989) (Silberman, J.); Shurberg, No. 84-1600, slip op. at 13 n.21 (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring). But see Shurberg, No. 84-1600, slip op. at 23 (Wald, J., dissenting).
In Shurberg the D.C. Circuit held unconstitutional under the fifth amendment equal protection clause the Commission's minority preference distress sale policy. Established in 1978, the
policy created an exception to the general rule that a noncomparative revocation hearing must
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acknowledging that the record before it showed little evidence demonstrating that prospective ownership barriers would operate to enhance viewpoint
diversity, recognized the presumption as constitutional.2 14
To further assure economic deconcentration through barriers to market
entry, the Commission relies not only upon its ownership regulations, but
also upon its comparative hearing process to select among competing applicants for a broadcast license.2 15 Ownership of other media of mass communication often results in the assessment of a conclusive demerit in
comparative broadcast hearings that precludes acquisition of a new broadcast license.2 16
But if, as the Commission submits, a tremendous multiplicity of media
outlets and competing voices now exists, 2 " then the central underpinning of
the Commission's diversification policy, a need to promote maximal competition in the media marketplace to ensure maximal competition in the marbe held whenever serious doubts arise as to the basic legal qualifications of an existing licensee.
That exception permitted a licensee designated for a revocation hearing to assign the license to
a "qualified" assignee. "Qualified" assignees were those either controlled by minority owners,
or comprised of minority owners holding in excess of 50% of the assignee's equity. See Policy
Statement and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in Broadcasting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 851 (1982); Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 983 (1978); see also
Shurberg, No. 84-1600, slip op. at 3.
Judge Silberman understood the minority preference distress sale policy to be an outgrowth
of two distinct FCC regulatory objectives: 1) to remedy past discrimination, and 2) to promote
viewpoint diversity. Shurberg, No. 84-1600, slip op. at 1. Although the court was unable to
reach a consensus on the constitutionality of the viewpoint diversity objective, Judge Silberman attacked FCC policy concerning the diversity objective in dicta, noting that "it seems
passing strange that a policy purporting to promote diversity should itself rest on a racial
generalization." Id. at 40. Most critically for purposes of this article, Judge Silberman viewed
existing marketplace diversity and the plethora of non-spectrum based alternatives to broadcasting, as the Commission found in Syracuse Peace Council, to vitiate any basis for continuation of the FCC's diversity policy. Shurberg, No. 84-1600, slip op. at 38-39. But see Winter
Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, Nos. 85-1755, 85-1756, slip. op. (D.C. Cir. Apr. 21, 1989)
(minority preferences in initial licensing no violation of equal protection). The Winter Park
opinion makes no attempt to distinguish or address the points raised in Sherburg. Obviously,
an en banc panel of the D.C. Circuit must reconcile these conflicting opinions.
214. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting (NCCB), 436 U.S. 775, 795
(1978).
215. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394 (1965)
("We believe that there are two primary objectives toward which the process of comparison
should be directed. They are, first, the best practicable service to the public, and, second, a
maximum diffusion of control of the media of mass communications.").
216. See, e.g., Caldwell Broadcasting Corp., 100 F.C.C.2d 115 (Rev. Bd. 1985); Chapman
Radio & Television Co., 19 F.C.C.2d 157 (Rev. Bd. 1969); RKO General, Inc. (WRKO), 60
Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1215 (ALJ 1986), vacated as moot, 65 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 837 (1988).
217. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd 5043, 5051 (1987), aff'd, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); see also supra note 5.
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ketplace of ideas,2"' no longer exists.2 19 Under these circumstances, no
constitutional rationale remains for denying the broadcast media first
amendment protection equivalent to that enjoyed by the print media. In
fact, in the current era of wide-open intermedia competition, very few functional differences between the print and broadcast media exist. What few
functional differences that may remain certainly do not warrant maintaining
the double constitutional standard that now prevails.2 2 °
IV.

THE PROGRESSIVE CONVERGENCE OF THE PRINT AND
ELECTRONIC MEDIA

In the early decades of the twentieth century, the economic and physical
distinctions between the print and broadcast media that underlie the Commission's "diversification" policies and rules purportedly were numerous
and seemingly self-evident. The number of broadcast outlets nationwide was
far fewer than the number of print media outlets.2 2 1 Only broadcast media
relied upon long distance electronic transmission of information and opinion
to reach the public. However, with the passage of time, the number of elec222
tronic media outlets has come to exceed the number of newspaper outlets,
and now both the broadcast and print media rely upon long distance electronic transmission of information and opinion to reach the public. 223 This
218. See supra notes 18, 19, 209-16.
219. See infra notes 253-74 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
221. In 1934, there were 583 AM stations in the United States. See Stem, Krasnow, &
Senkowski, The New Video Marketplace and the Search for a Coherent Regulatory Philosophy,
32 CATH. U.L. REV. 563 (1983). By comparison, in 1934 there were 1,929 total daily newspapers in the United States. See U. S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES SERIES R 224-231, NEWSPAPERS-NUMBER AND CIRCULATION OF
DAILY AND SUNDAY NEWSPAPERS: 1920 TO 1970, at 809 (1976).
222. In 1960, there were 4,133 radio stations on the air in the United States. See TELEVISION AND CABLE FACTBOOK C-309 (1988). There were also 559 television stations on the air
in the United States. Id. at C-299. By comparison, in 1960 there were 11,315 newspapers in
the United States. See 1988 STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 528 [hereinafter 1988 STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS].
In 1987, there were approximately 10,244 radio stations operating in the United States. See
BROADCASTING/CABLECASTING YEARBOOK 1988 at A-2 [hereinafter BROADCASTING/
CABLECASTING YEARBOOK]. There were also 1,342 television stations operating in the United
States. Id. There were an additional 7,900 cable systems operating in 1987. TELEVISION AND
CABLE FACTBOOK, supra, at C-358. By comparison, in 1987 there were 9,031 newspapers in
the United States. See 1988 STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS, supra, at 528; see also P. VESTAL, AN
ANALYSIS OF MEDIA OUTLETS BY MARKET, app. 11 (1987) (prepared for the Research and
Planning Department, National Association of Broadcasters) ("The average market has access
to 36 cable channels with a 48.8% penetration rate, 10 over the air television signals, 20.4 AM
and 19.5 FM radio signals, 15.9 newspapers, 11.8 magazines each with subscription rate
figures of at least five percent, and a VCR penetration rate of 48.7%").
223. R. DUCEY, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN AN AGE OF CONVERGING MEDIA (1984)
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trend toward physical convergence of the broadcast and print media seems
destined to continue.
Additionally, the public's progressive movement away from the print and
toward the electronic media224 has encouraged dramatic change in the media environment that has significantly undermined the factual predicate for
affording the broadcast media less constitutional protection than the print
media.
A.

The Merging of the Print and Electronic Press

The nation's major newspapers and magazines, including USA Today, the
Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and Time, rely upon satellite,
telecommunication, and computer technologies to transmit news and information across the globe.22 5 Teletext (an electronic publishing service that
permits the viewer to receive pictographic and textual information from his
viewing screen), videotex (a two-way communication service by telephone or
cable for electronic mail, home-to-office data retrieval and transmission,
home banking, etc.), home computers, and interactive cable technologies all
permit data which historically appeared only in print now to occupy a video
screen."6 By June of 1984, one in eight U.S. and Canadian daily newspapers were either "operating, planning, or considering videotex or teletext
ventures." 2'27 The National Association of Broadcasters, relying upon trade
industry data, projects that by the year 2000, 75% of American households
will have access to teletext, 60% to videotex, 65% to home computers, and
48% to interactive cable.22 CBS, NBC, and cable superstation WTBS offer
teletext signals nationwide.2 2 9 Several local television stations offer similar
services.230 This evidence compels one ineluctable conclusion: The print
and electronic media are merging into new hybrid forms that do not lend
themselves to the broadcast/non-broadcast distinctions of the past. It is
therefore imperative that the courts develop a uniform legal standard to address this world of converging media.2 31
(prepared for Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters), reprinted in Comments of Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, FCC Gen. Docket No. 84-282, app. B (Sept. 6, 1988).
224. Sixty-six percent "of the U. S. public turns to TV as the source of most of its news,

and... 55.9% [rank] it as the most believable news source."

BROADCASTING/CABLECASTING

YEARBOOK 1988, supra note 222, at A-2.

225. See R. DUCEY, supra note 223, at 3.
226. See generally Stern, Krasnow, & Senkowski, supra note 221.
227. R. DUCEY, supra note 223, at 2.
228. Id. at 5.
229. Id. at 6.
230. Id.
231. In Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 3196 (1987), Judge Bork affirmed the Commission's decision not
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The ComparativeScarcity of the Print and Electronic Press

The number of newspapers published in this country has declined from
11,400 in 1975 to 9,031 in 1987.232 Newspapers are a current daily, weekly,
or semi-weekly source to which the public can turn in addition to or in lieu
of radio and television for timely news and information. The number of
broadcast media outlets, including AM and FM radio and UHF and VHF
television stations, has increased from 8,697 in 1975 to 11,715 in 1988.233 In
that same period, the number of operating cable systems has increased from
3,506 to 8,500.234 In simple numerical terms, the electronic media have become the media of abundance and the print media have become increasingly
scarce-reversing the essential premise of the broadcast scarcity rationale.
Moreover, in economic terms, the market barriers to entry into newspaper
publishing are significantly greater than those for entry into broadcasting. A
1984 comparative analysis of economic barriers to entry into the newspaper
and broadcast industries, conducted by Michael 0. Wirth for the National
Association of Broadcasters, reached the following conclusions:
Far less capital is required to start a new television station or radio
station than to start a new daily newspaper. For example, starting
a 250,000 circulation daily newspaper is estimated to be seven
times more expensive than starting a Top 50 market television
station....
On average, entrepreneurs pay much less, per unit of average daily
circulation purchased, for television and radio stations than they
pay for daily newspapers. For example, the average 250,000 circulation daily newspaper sold for three times more per unit of daily
circulation than the average Top 50 market television station.
The costs of operating a daily newspaper are considerably higher
than the costs of operating either a television or a radio station.
For example, a typical 250,000 circulation newspaper costs five
times more to operate than a typical Top 50 television station.
Convincing consumers and advertisers to adopt a new media firm's
product, when the new firm is in competition with one or more
existing media firm [sic] of the same type, is a more difficult propoto apply the Fairness Doctrine to teletext. This precedent is a major judicial step toward
unifying the broadcast and print media constitutional standards. See Zaragoza & Emord,
Electronic Media May Get Same Protectionas Print Journalists,Legal Times, Mar. 9, 1987, at

15-17.
232. See 1988 STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS, supra note 222, at 528.
233. See TELEVISION AND CABLE FACTBOOK, supra note 222, at C-299, C-309; By the

Numbers, Broadcasting, Oct. 3, 1988, at 16.
234. See TELEVISION AND CABLE FACTBOOK, supra note 222, at C-358; By the Numbers,
Broadcasting, Oct. 3, 1988, at 16.
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sition for a daily newspaper than for either a television or a radio
station.2 35
The empirical data underlying these conclusions strongly suggest that in
simple economic terms, it is now far more costly to enter the newspaper
publishing business than to enter broadcasting, despite the FCC's regulatory
barriers to entry into the radio and television industry.
V.

THE CHANGED MEDIA MARKETPLACE AND THE EROSION OF THE
SPECTRUM SCARCITY RATIONALE

A.

The Tell-Tale Heart236 of Red Lion Nears Arrest

Among the progeny of NBC,23 7 Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC238 has
served as the most formidable precedent for preservation of the scarcity rationale underpinning broadcast regulation. Consequently, the continuing
validity of the facts and assumptions underlying Red Lion are of great significance to the future utility of the scarcity rationale and the regulatory construct that the rationale supports.
In Red Lion, the Supreme Court assessed the "state of commercially acceptable technology" as it existed in 1969.239 The Court found that in 1969
"only a tiny fraction of those with resources and intelligence" could "hope
to communicate [intelligibly] at the same time. '"" Specifically, the Court
observed the existence of a broadcast environment wherein VHF frequencies
were "almost entirely occupied" and alternative audio and video means of
235.

M. WIRTH, ECONOMIC BARRIERS TO ENTRY: DAILY NEWSPAPERS VS. TELEVISION

STATIONS VS. RADIO STATIONS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS ii (1984) (prepared for the Nat'l
Ass'n of Broadcasters), reprinted in Comments of Nat'1 Ass'n of Broadcasters, FCC Gen.
Docket No. 84-282, app. C (Sept. 6, 1988) [hereinafter ENTRY BARRIERS]. In particular, Dr.
Wirth found that:
[S]tarting a large market television station is one-seventh as expensive as starting a
250,000 circulation daily newspaper; starting a medium market television station is
almost one-fourth as expensive as starting a 65,000 circulation daily newspaper; and
starting a small market television station is almost one-half as expensive as starting a
20,000 circulation daily newspaper.
Id. at 10-11. Applying the newspaper comparison to radio, Dr. Wirth found that "large market radio stations are one-eighteenth as expensive to start, medium market stations are onetwentieth as expensive to start, and small market radio stations are almost one-fourteenth as
expensive to start." Id. at 11.
236. See Poe, The Tell-Tale Heart, in THE UNABRIDGED EDGAR ALLEN POE 799 (T.
Mossman ed. 1983). Like the old man in Poe's Tell-Tale Heart, Red Lion will not die
peacefully. Unlike the old man's, Red Lion's passing will be justifiable homicide rather than
murder.
237. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
238. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
239. Id. at 388.
240. Id.
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communication were not yet viable.24 ' In CBS v. DemocraticNational Committee,24 2 the Court agreed that the FCC's content regulations, formerly appropriate under the first amendment, might not be constitutional in the
future, recognizing that technological change could affect the delicate balance of private and state interests struck by the Court's prior rulings.243
In FCC v. League of Women Voters,244 the Court again expressed its willingness to reassess its traditional acceptance of Red Lion's scarcity rationale
if Congress or the FCC sent a "signal" "that technological developments
have advanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required."24' 5 In Syracuse Peace Council,2 46 the Commission
sent the Court just such a signal. Persuaded by extraordinary growth in
mass media outlets since 1969, the Commission concluded that Red Lion's
lessened degree of constitutional scrutiny could no longer be justified, stating
boldly:
We . . . believe that the scarcity rationale developed in the Red
Lion decision and successive cases no longer justifies a different
standard of First Amendment review for the electronic press.
Therefore, in response to the question raised by the Supreme Court
in League of Women Voters, we believe that the standard applied in
Red Lion should be reconsidered and that the constitutional principles applicable to the printed press should be equally applicable to
2 47
the electronic press.
241. Id. at 398.
242. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).

243. The Court wrote:
Balancing the various First Amendment interests involved in the broadcast media
and determining what best serves the public's right to be informed is a task of great
delicacy and difficulty ....
The problems of regulation are rendered more difficult
because the broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change; solutions
adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and those acceptable today may
well be outmoded 10 years hence.
Id. at 102.
244. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
245. Id. at 376 n. It.
246. 2 FCC Rcd 5043 (1987), aff'd, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
247. Id. at 5053. In affirming the Commission's Syracuse Peace Council decision, the D.C.
Circuit found that the Commission had adequately supported its policy judgment that Fairness
Doctrine enforcement no longer served the public interest, and that the FCC could have repealed the Doctrine even if it had not concluded that the Doctrine was unconstitutional. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Although the FCC had
argued that its constitutional and policy rationale were "inextricably intertwined," Judge Williams, writing for the court, consciously avoided the core constitutional question. He wrote:
"[I]f we are persuaded that the Commission would have found that the fairness doctrine did
not serve the public interest even if it had foregone its ruminations on the constitutional issue,
we must end our inquiry without reaching that issue." Id. at 657.
Judge Starr, in an intriguing concurring opinion, disagreed, writing "[i]t ... cannot success-

1989]

First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership

B.

The Bankruptcy of Economic Scarcity

With far more audio and video outlets than print outlets in small and
large markets,2 48 and with the cost of acquiring and operating newspaper
outlets far in excess of the same cost for comparable broadcast outlets, 249 the
notion of "uniqueness" inherent in the scarcity rationale is now anachronistic. It is simply no longer true that opportunities to own print outlets of
mass communication are more abundant or more easily attainable than are
opportunities to own audio or video means of communication. In both contexts, cost, not the scarcity of ownership opportunities, is the primary factor
delimiting access.
However, the cost of access alone cannot form the reason for affording a
lesser degree of first amendment protection to the electronic press if the
amendment is to retain its historical integrity in the print media context.
The fact that only some Americans in the new nation could afford to own
and operate a printing press was not deemed by the framers as a proper
ground for circumscribing freedom of the press.25 °
fully be maintained that the [Fairness Doctrine] Order is based, either exclusively or alternatively, on public interest grounds.... There is no escaping this cold, hard fact: in the wake of
the generously worded Meredith remand, the Commission has rendered a Red Lion decision.
It has switched gears from three years ago and gone beyond the less heroic, public interest
reach of the 1985 [Fairness] Report." Id. at 675 (Starr, J., concurring). In questioning the
correctness of the majority's reticence to review whether the FCC had properly interpreted
constitutional precedent, Judge Staff touched upon the continued vitality of the spectrum scarcity rationale underlying the print/broadcast constitutional distinction. Judge Staff believes
that "spectrum scarcity, without more, does not justify regulatory schemes which intrude into
First Amendment territory." Id.at 683. In identifying appropriate scarcity considerations, he
believes that "the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine is closely related to the incapacity
of the communications marketplace to give expression to diverse voices," id., and not to the
fact that demand for broadcast frequencies exceed supply, a fact upon which the Syracuse
Peace Council petitioners based their conception of the Red Lion scarcity rationale. Id. at 682.
Under current marketplace conditions, Judge Starr noted, because "individual members of the
listening or viewing public ...may express their viewpoints on controversial issues in any
number of ways that do not involve applying for and receiving a broadcasting license, it seems
odd (and inaccurate) to equate scarcity in licenses with scarcity in the marketplace of ideas."
Id. at 683. Judge Starr's approach to judicial review of FCC decisions which involve a constitutional conclusion by the agency would require a reviewing court to 1) determine whether the
FCC had correctly interpreted the Red Lion constitutional standard, a question over which the
court would have plenary review authority; and 2) review the FCC's findings of fact, which
would be subject to a much narrower standard of review. Id. at 679. Applying these principles, Judge Starr concluded that the FCC's repeal of the Fairness Doctrine was "based on
reasonable factual findings and embodies a correct statement of applicable constitutional principles." Id. at 680.
248. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
250. Nevertheless, even if cost is deemed a significant factor, it has been shown that the
cost of entering the print media business greatly exceeds the cost of entering the broadcast
media business, despite government licensing of the broadcast press. See supra note 235.
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Spectrum scarcity, if ever it was a sound basis for affording lessened protection to the electronic press, is not now in any way different from the scarcity associated with all other economic goods in our society. Consequently,
economic scarcity cannot serve as a meaningful basis for distinguishing the
electronic press from the print media.25 1 In addition, the present abundance
of substitutes for spectrum-based communications media renders the physical scarcity rationale superfluous.25 2
C.

The Advent of Competitive Audio and Video Media Not Dependent
Upon BroadcastSpectrum

In an age of electronic media abundance and wide-ranging non-spectrumbased media alternatives, spectrum scarcity has become an outmoded concept, no longer tied to certain technological barriers to the propagation and
dissemination of electronic audio and video messages. Non-spectrum-based
outlets for information and ideas are potentially limitless in the number of
viewing and listening options they offer to the public.
Cable television, most prominent among these newer media, now reaches
over 52.8% of the 88.6 million television households in America.25 3 By all
accounts, it presents direct and significant competition to broadcast television, with dozens of alternative networks catering to diverse segments of the
viewing public.25 4 In addition to the traditional broadcast networks, among
the great variety of new cable networks delivered by satellite to the headends
of cable systems nationwide are: The Nashville Network, The Disney Channel, Showtime, Spanish International Network, Cable News Network
(CNN), CNN Headline News, ESPN, The Movie Channel, Christian Broadcasting Network, Home Box Office (HBO), Cinemax, Galavision, USA Network, Discovery, Home Shopping Network, C-SPAN, and Nickelodeon.2 55
In 1988, 67.3% of cable systems offered their subscribers from 20 to 50 or
more channels.25 6 The median cable system offers between 30 and 53 chan251. As Judge Bork astutely observed in Telecommunications Research and Action Center
v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987):
All economic goods are scarce, not least the newsprint, ink, delivery trucks, computers, and other resources that go into the production and dissemination of print
journalism.... Since scarcity is a universal fact, it can hardly explain regulation in
one context and not another. The attempt to use a universal fact as a distinguishing
principle necessarily leads to analytical confusion.
Id. at 508.
252. See infra notes 253-75 and accompanying text.
253. See By the Numbers, Broadcasting, Oct. 3, 1988, at 16.
254. See Zoglin, The Big Boy's Blues, Time, Oct. 17, 1988, at 56-61.
255. Facts and Figures, Multichannel News, June 6, 1988, at 49.
256. JOINT NAB/CAB/CIRT MEETING REPORT, Sept. 25-27, 1988 (available from the
Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters' Research and Planning Dep't).
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nels. 2 7 Pay cable is now in 24 million households, reaching 28.3% of all
television households.2 5 Cable may well replace broadcast television as the
medium of choice in the next century. Satellite Master Antenna Television,
a form of cable system that is largely unregulated and operates exclusively
on private property, typically as a multichannel service to apartment dwellers, is also not spectrum-dependent.
Videocassette recorders (VCR's), another non-spectrum-based competitor
to both cable and broadcast television, remove viewing time sensitivity, permitting the viewer to record on a different channel than the one being
viewed. 259 This enhances opportunities for competitive selection and sampling of various media options. In 1987, 48 million VCR's were in use in the
United States.2" These devices are now found in 58% of television households.26 1 It is predicted that by 1992 VCR's will be in 80% of television
households. 26 2 Compact disc players, a non-spectrum-based alternative to
radio, are now in approximately four million households and are being offered as optional equipment in new automobiles.26 3 Such means of receiving
news and information, that do not depend upon spectrum and offer myriad
viewing and listening options, not only enhance the competitive media environment, but also virtually eliminate any prospect of the feared "mind control by media barons" that led the Commission's first regulators to create
barriers to broadcast entry.2 4
1. Viewpoint Diversity Now Proliferates
The emergence of a wide range of viewing and listening options, together
with relatively open entry into new electronic media markets, makes it
highly unlikely that the Commission's fears of economic and viewpoint monopolization will materialize, either now or in the future. Virtually every
media market in the country is filled with a great variety of video images and
radio voices, all competing for the public eye and ear. In a 1987 study, Peter
Vestal of the National Association of Broadcasters' Research and Planning
Department found that the average market (from among those tracked by
the A.C. Nielsen Company) had "access to 36 cable channels ....ten overthe-air television signals, 20.4 AM and 19.5 FM radio signals, 15.9 newspa257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Sony Corp, v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
260. See TELEVISION AND CABLE FACTBOOK, supra note 222, at C-300.
261. JOINT NAB/CAB/CIRT MEETING REPORT, supra note 256, at fig. 1.

262.
July 11,
263.
264.

See O'Brien, Pay Penetration of 30% Likely by 1992: Report, Multichannel News,
1988, at 33.
JOINT NAB/CAB/CIRT MEETING REPORT, supra note 256, at 9.
See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
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pers, 11.8 magazines each with subscription rate figures of at least five per-

cent, and a VCR penetration rate of 48.7%. '' 265
2.

Economic Competition is Now Legion

Analyzing 209 of A.C. Nielsen's Designated Market Areas (DMA's), Vestal found that in the nation's top 25 DMA's, on average there were 13.4
television stations, 29.8 AM stations, 29.2 FM stations, 2.8 newspapers, and
12 magazines; in addition, 44% of the television households were receiving
266
41.9 cable channels, and 54.1% of the television households had VCR's.
Among the markets in the top 25 DMA's are New York; Los Angeles; Chicago; Philadelphia; San Francisco-Oakland-Santa Monica; Boston; Detroit;
Dallas-Fort Worth; Washington, D.C.; Cleveland-Akron; Houston; and
Atlanta.
In DMA's 26 through 50, there were 7.6 television stations, 15.8 AM stations, 13.4 FM stations, 2.5 newspapers, and 11.1 magazines; 50.5% of the
television households were receiving 32.9 cable channels, and 42.5% of the
television households had VCR's.2 67 Among the markets in DMA's 26
through 50 were San Diego; Milwaukee; Cincinnati; Nashville; Charlotte;
New Orleans; Buffalo; Oklahoma City; Columbus, Ohio; Raleigh-Durham;
Salt Lake City; and San Antonio.
In DMA's 101 through 125, there were 5.6 television stations, 7.6 AM
stations, 8.1 FM stations, 2.6 newspapers, and 11.1 magazines; 5 3.7% of the
television markets were receiving 26.7 cable channels, and 41.8% of the television households had VCR's.26
Among the markets in DMA's 101
through 125 were Sioux Falls-Mitchell, South Dakota; Ft. Wayne, Indiana;
Ft. Myers-Naples, Florida; Peoria-Bloomington, Illinois; Lansing, Michigan;
Augusta, Georgia; Charleston, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; Lafayette, Louisiana; Santa Barbara-Santa Maria, California; Rockford, Illinois;
Wilmington, Delaware; Columbus, Georgia; Terre Haute, Indiana; and
Corpus Christi, Texas.
In DMA's 176 through 200, there were 2.8 television stations, 3.6 AM
stations, 3.8 FM stations, 1.8 newspapers, and 11.7 magazines; 60.4% of the
television households were receiving 25.9 cable channels, and 38.1% of the
television households had VCR's.2 69 Among the markets in DMA's 176
through 200 were Ada-Ardmore, Oklahoma; Roswell, New Mexico; BiloxiGulfport, Mississippi; Parkersburg, West Virginia; Cheyenne-Scottsbluff,
265. P. VESTAL, supra note 222, at 1.
266. Id. at 6-7, 9, 11-12.

267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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Wyoming; Alexandria, Minnesota; Butte, Montana; Jackson, Tennessee; Ottumwa-Kirksville, Iowa; San Angelo, Texas; Lima, Ohio; Bowling Green,
Kentucky; Laredo, Texas; and Zanesville, Ohio.
In DMA's 201 +, there were 3.1 television stations, 2.5 AM stations, 3.3
FM stations, 0.7 newspapers, and 11.3 magazines; 51.4% of the television
households were receiving 20.9 cable channels, and 42.9% of television
households had VCR's. 270 The markets in DMA's 200+ included Presque
Isle, Maine; Victoria, Texas; Twin Falls, Idaho; Bend, Oregon; Fairbanks,
Alaska; Helena, Montana; Alpena, Michigan; North Platte, Nebraska; and
Glendive, Montana.
The smallest markets were found to have a cable penetration rate that
exceeded the national average. From the largest to the smallest markets
studied, no market was identified as being limited to just one media source of
news, information, and entertainment.2 7 1
A 1987 market concentration study conducted by Mark R. Fratrik, Director of Financial and Economic Research at the National Association of
Broadcasters, measured the top 259 Arbitron radio markets using the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines.2 72 The study took into account only
radio stations, rather than radio's broader range of competitors, including
compact disc players, videocassette recorders, record players, and cable network Music Television. The study data revealed that under the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI), 47.9% of the 259 markets were "unconcentrated,"
38.6% were "moderately concentrated," and 13.5% were "highly concentrated. '273 Larger markets tended to have lower concentration levels than
smaller markets.2 74
It is no longer true that transmission of audio and video messages can
occur only via the use of a scarce resource that is somehow unique among all
other communication outlets. Thus, the basis for ownership restrictionsindeed, for the entire FCC regulatory labyrinth-no longer exists. Carefully
considered, spectrum scarcity, if ever it was a sound basis for a reduced degree of constitutional protection for broadcasters, should now be abandoned
by the Supreme Court as obsolete in the new media age. Moreover, an anal270. Id.
271. Id.
272. M. FRATRIK, AN UPDATED EXAMINATION OF MARKET CONCENTRATION IN RADIO
MARKETS 1-2 (1987) (prepared for the Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters). The Justice Department
Antitrust Division applies a formula known as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to measure
relative market concentration to determine if a particular business combination poses a threat
to competition. Id. at 2; see infra notes 360-61.
273. M. FRATNIK, supra note 272, at 4.
274. Id.
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ysis of viewpoint and economic diversity in the current market reveals that
the feared "one voice" to the exclusion of all others is a myth.
D.

The ConstitutionalInvalidity of Ownership Regulations Absent Scarcity

Radio, television, cable, and all the new media technologies share
profound commonalities and largely insignificant dissimilarities with the
traditional printed press. These media all communicate news, information,
and/or entertainment to audiences. They all compete for the attention of
viewers and listeners and lose their audiences to competing media to the
extent that they carry non-useful or undesirable messages. All media perform an informational function, using pictures, images, sounds, or combinations of the three, in an effort to leave a lasting impression that will cause
audiences to become loyal spectators or listeners. Over time, the media have
come increasingly to share the same means of transmitting information.
Despite almost 200 years of evolution under the first amendment, the
mass communications media is today, even in its present variety of forms,
perhaps no more or less significant to the typical modem American than the
printed press of 1791 was to the citizens of the new republic. To the American in the early period of our nation, the public presses carried precious bits
of commercial and political information.2 75 Modern man looks for the same
commercial and political content from the electronic press. In the end, then
as now, the ultimate power of reason in each individual determines the comparative value of each idea expressed. This value reflects itself in audience
size for any particular medium, which in turn determines the longevity of
any company in the media business. Rather than being a business whose
spokespeople dictate to the public what will be the national orthodoxy, the
media, since colonial times, have tended to reflect popular concerns and to
respond to popular passions, or they simply have not survived. Without the
scarcity identified in NBC, and its progeny, as producing a legitimate government interest in differentiating media, only these profound commonalities
that bind together the various speech forms remain.
1. No Justification Exists to Deny Broadcast Media Full PrintModel
Protection
In media law, aside from the obscenity and indecency area,2 76 only the
scarcity rationale exists as precedential support for affording the electronic
275. See, e.g., Botein, Printers and the American Revolution, in THE PRESS AND THE
17, 19-20 (1980).
276. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973).
AMERICAN REVOLUTION
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press less than full first amendment protection. Therefore, if the scarcity
rationale is abandoned, as it should be, print model cases such as Miami
HeraldPublishing Co. v. Tornillo277 must be applied to test the constitutionality of governmental restraints on broadcasting. Under such precedent,
government would be denied the power to interfere with the editorial judgment of broadcasters.2 7 Government would also be denied the power to
prevent "private censorship" i.e., the decision of a broadcast media owner to
air his desired viewpoints to the exclusion of all others. 279 The government
would have no power to restrict even the most strident articulation of biased
viewpoints.28 °
Furthermore, the government could not delimit the private speech of
some voices in the broadcast marketplace, such as multiple owners, in order
to enhance the voices of others, such as new media entrants.28 ' Nor could
the government compel broadcasters to turn over programming time to special interest groups in order for these groups to express their views. 28 2 The
government could have no right to regulate the national marketplace of
ideas in order to foster a certain preferred level of viewpoint diversity, for
broadcasters would be free to decline to foster such diversity.28 3
2. Print Model ConstitutionalRequirements Preclude Reliance on
Barriers to Entry
The broadcast ownership regulations and policies of the FCC, without
exception, depend upon broad prophylactic rules to proscribe local and national ownership concentrations. Additionally, the rules seek to preclude
monopolization of both the economic marketplace and the marketplace of
ideas. The prophylactic nature of the ownership rules and policies makes
them applicable regardless of the actual level of economic concentration
277. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).

278. Id. at 258.
279. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 153 (Douglas, J., concurring)
("Of course there is private censorship in the newspaper field. But for one publisher who may

suppress a fact, there are many who will print it. But if the Government is the censor, administrative fiat, not freedom of choice, carries the day.").
280. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978); infra text
accompanying note 334. *

281. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976); see also infra note 286.
282. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Util. Comm. of California, 475 U.S. 1, 9
(1986) (invalidating a public utility commission's order requiring utilities to allow third parties
to use the utility's billing envelopes to disseminate their ideas) ("Compelled access like that
ordered in this case both penalizes the expression of particular points of view and forces speakers to alter their speech to conform with an agenda they do not set.").
283. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977) (invalidating state statute

requiring motorists to display the state motto on their license plates).
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present, thereby severely impinging upon the speech rights of broadcasters
by placing upon them an arbitrary limitation.2" 4 Under the print model of
constitutionality, which prohibits government enhancement of some voices
and delimitation of others, a court would find this type of regulation unconstitutional. The viewpoint-fostering element of the rules and policies, imposed on conduct that does not rise to the level of an antitrust law
violation,2 85 also unconstitutionally infringes upon freedom of the press.
All of the ownership rules and policies create barriers to market entry that
are applied in a manner that prohibits speech by multiple broadcast owners
in favor of speech by new market entrants.28 6 These rules and policies are
applied without proof of antitrust law violations but rather to prevent the
possibility of future undesirable market concentration. By silencing the
voices of some to enhance the voices of others, and by endeavoring to foster
a certain preferred level of viewpoint diversity, the government impermissibly trenches upon the freedom of the press under the print model standard.
VI.

TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE UNDER THE PRINT MODEL

With the exception of the broadcast regulatory context, the Court has repeatedly construed the first amendment with a view toward its intended
meaning, 287 although differences of opinion exist as to precisely what that
meaning is. 2 8 In the broadcast context, however, the Court has avoided the
284. In Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1454-55 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1169 (1986), the court, in invalidating an FCC regulation requiring cable television
systems to carry certain local broadcast signals, noted that the Commission's predictive judgment, that in the absence of the regulation competitive harm to the broadcast stations would
result, did not satisfy the "substantial government interest" component of the intermediate
scrutiny standard of first amendment review. Id. at 1454.
285. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
286. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976). In Buckley, the Supreme Court, in
holding invalid certain provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act, which limited expenditures by individuals or groups seeking to influence the outcome of elections, observed
that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." Id.
But see FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting (NCCB), 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978)
(distinguishing Buckley based on the "special problems" posed by broadcast communications).
287. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271, 273-77 (1964).
288. See D. Teeter, A Legacy of Expression: Philadelphia Newspapers and Congress During the War for Independence (1966) (unpublished dissertation, The University of Wisconsin,
Madison; Ph.D., School of Journalism); see also M. Yodelis, Boston's Second Major Paper
War: Economics, Politics and the Theory and Practice of Political Expression in the Press,
1763-1775 (1971) (unpublished dissertation, The University of Wisconsin, Madison; Ph.D.,
School of Journalism). Compare L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985) with J.
SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM:

THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY AMERICAN JOURNAL-

ISM (1988); Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455 (1983).
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traditional philosophical bases for the amendment and has thereby denied
the first amendment its full protective compass.
To move the broadcast press within the print model in a manner that will
not diminish the protective value of existing print model precedent, it is necessary to abide by the core values of the first amendment. These values stem
directly from the founding era and can best be understood by comprehending the philosophical views supporting the concept of freedom of expression as it existed in 1791. By endeavoring to preserve the integrity and
vitality of the first amendment through the ages, the Court ensures the people that their fundamental liberties will not be compromised.
A.

Lessons From the Past: The Framers' Construct

The first amendment is the product of an age of intense public awareness
of the rights of mankind and the need to protect these rights from deprivation at the hands of misguided governors. 289 To understand the philosophical underpinnings of the amendment requires an appreciation of the
historical context within which it arose.
The Bill of Rights and, more particularly, the first amendment, grew out
of the political contest to attain ratification of the Constitution of 1787. In
an effort to appease anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution, and perhaps to secure his own election to the first Congress, James Madison shifted
away from his earlier opposition to a Bill of Rights 290 and embraced the ten
amendments, pledging to secure their adoption in the first Congress.2 9 1
Of the amendment recommendations submitted by the various states,
Madison "drew heavily" from George Mason's Virginia Declaration of
289. See, e.g., Paine, Common Sense, in THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS
PAINE 4 (P. Foner ed. 1974).
290. From October 27, 1787, until August 16, 1788, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton,
and John Jay wrote 85 letters in favor of the Constitution proper in New York City newspapers. See THE FEDERALIST at viii (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (editor's introduction). In THE FEDERALIST No. 84, Hamilton argued that a Bill of Rights was "not only unnecessary" but
"would even be dangerous." THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961). "[W]hy declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?" he queried. "Why... should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no
power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?" Id. at 513-14.
291. See, e.g., R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, at 194-96

(1955), which quotes a letter from James Madison to a campaign worker in Madison's congressional district:
[I]t is my sincere opinion that the Constitution ought to be revised, and that the
first Congress meeting under it, ought to prepare and recommend to the States for

ratification, the most satisfactory provisions for all essential rights, particularly the
rights of Conscience in the fullest latitude, the freedom of the press, trials by jury,
security against general warrants ....

Id. at 195-96.
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Rights,29 2 which Madison had helped to draft. Although the Virginia Declaration included a freedom of the press provision, it lacked a freedom of
speech provision.29 3 The anti-Federalist George Mason had incorporated,
into the Virginia Declaration of Rights, not the typical language associated
with the crabbed Blackstonian definition of press liberty,294 but rather the
lay "Bulwark of Liberty" language that mirrored the verbiage employed by
two of the 18th century's most famous radical Whigs. 2" These Whigs
(known as coffeehouse radicals),2 96 John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon,
were greatly renowned in America for their 138 provocative essays on liberty
republished in a compendium entitled Cato's Letters.29 7 Mason's choice of
the "Bulwark of Liberty" language from Cato's Letter No. 15 was likely no
coincidence, for it is known that Mason was familiar with Cato's Letters.2 98
Madison came to rely upon that language in one of his proposals to amend
the Constitution of 1787.
On June 8, 1789, James Madison finally succeeded in acquiring the attention of the House of Representatives long enough to introduce his amendments. 299 The amendments were designed to satisfy the concerns of the antiFederalists who clung to the view that the Constitution did not adequately
protect their natural, inalienable rights from deprivation by the encroaching
292.

T.

SHUMATE,

INTRODUCTION

TO THE

FIRST AMENDMENT:

THE LEGACY

OF

GEORGE MASON 66-67 (1985).
293. R. RUTLAND, supra note 291, at 202, 231-33.
294. Sir William Blackstone's definition of the press liberty was the antithesis of the radical
Whig concept. Nevertheless, by the mid-eighteenth century the Blackstone view was the law
of the land in England and in the colonial courts. It provided that:
The liberty of the press.., consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every
freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public:
to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52.

295. See 1 J. TRENCHARD & T. GORDON, CATO'S LETTERS: ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL
AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 96, 100 (1971 reprint) (originally in vol.
I). Trenchard and Gordon submit that "Freedom of Speech is the great Bulwark of Liberty"
and explain that free speech and liberty "prosper and die together." Id.
296. See, e.g., B. BAILYN, PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1750-1776, at
28-29 (1965).
297. First published serially in The London Journalfrom 1720 to 1723, Cato's Letters were
subsequently published in four volumes that, due to their renown, "went through six editions
between 1723 and 1755." L. LEVY, supra note 288, at 109. Historian Clinton Rossiter has
noted that "[n]o one can spend any time in the newspapers, library inventories, and pamphlets
of colonial America without realizing that Cato'sLetters rather than Locke's Civil Government
was the most popular, quotable, esteemed source of political ideas in the colonial period." C.
RosSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 141

(1953).

298. See T. SHUMATE, supra note 292, at 72.
299. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1006 (1971).
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3 00 Madison noted on the floor of the House
power of the new central state."
that "a great number of our constituents" opposed the Constitution but
would likely support it if Congress were to "expressly declare the great
rights of mankind secured.", 30 ' Among the amendments Madison introduced was one to protect the freedoms of speech, writing, publishing, and
the press:
The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to
speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of
the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be
inviolable.3 °2
The radical "Bulwark of Liberty" language of Cato's Letters thus appeared.
In addition to this proposed amendment, Madison offered another one specifically directed at the states:
No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or0 3the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.
Madison explained that the necessity for the amendments was due in part
to the fact that under the English common law (in the case of speech and
press, the Blackstonian concept), "[t]he freedom of the press and rights of
conscience, those choicest privileges of the people, are unguarded. ' ' 3° , In
support of his amendment to incorporate the speech and press protection to
the states, Madison stated that he wished "to extend this interdiction...
because it is proper that every Government be disarmed of powers [to]
trench upon those particular rights."30 5
Following the limited discussion of the proposed amendments, the House

referred them to a Committee of the Whole.30 6 On July 21, 1789, Congress

sent the proposed amendments to a select committee.30 7 In the select committee, Madison's language was revised. 308 Due to the absence of a select
committee record, it is not possible to tell whether the edits made to the
speech and press language were merely stylistic or whether they hold some
300. In a letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee, that veritable son of liberty and
anti-Federalist voiced his concern about the Constitution of 1787: "The Seeds of Aristocracy
...spring

even before the Conclusion of our Struggle for natural Rights of Men, Seeds which

like a Canker Worm lie at the Root of free Governments."
145.
301. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 299, at 1024.
302. Id. at 1026.
303. Id. at 1027.
304. Id. at 1028.
305. Id. at 1033.
306. Id. at 1042.
307. Anderson, supra note 288, at 478.

308. Id.

R. RUTLAND, supra note 291, at
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substantive meaning."' 9 The committee version read:
The freedom of speech and of the press, and the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and consult for their common good, and to
apply to the Government for the redress of grievances, shall not be
infringed.3 1 °
On August 15, 1789, the House adopted the select committee's version of
the amendment.3 1 On August 24, 1789, the House formally proposed that
the amendments become a part of the Constitution.3 12
On September 3, 1789, the Senate took up the amendment on speech and
press liberty. 3 The Senate proceedings were not recorded, so it is impossible to ascertain the senators' intentions. However, on September 4, 1789, the
Senate agreed to the following version of the amendment:
The Congress shall make no law, abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
consult for their common good, and to petition the government for
a redress of grievances.31 4
On September 9, 1789, the Senate combined the speech and press clauses
with the religion clauses to form a new amendment. 31 5 This version was
adopted by the Senate and submitted to the House. In a conference commit31 6
tee, the amendment was reformed to its current wording:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.31 7
From James Madison's remarks introducing the Bill of Rights to the First
Congress, and in the absence of any other public basis for its submission, the
first amendment must be presumed to have been designed to satisfy the antiFederalists' demands. The anti-Federalists, such as George Mason, adhered
to the Radical Whig view of the rights of man. In the areas of speech and
press, the essence of that view is best captured in the early eighteenth-century writings of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon to which, therefore,
one must turn for a more complete understanding of the first amendment.
309. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 299, at 1050.

310. Anderson, supra note 288, at 478.
311. Id. at 478-79.
312. Id. at 480.

313. Id.
314. Id.at 481.
315. Id. at 481-82.

316. Id. at 482.
317. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

1989]

1.

First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership

Radical Whig Conceptions of Free Speech and Press

Four of Trenchard and Gordon's letters on liberty were dedicated to
speech and press freedoms.'1 8 Trenchard and Gordon understood "Freedom of Speech" to be the right "of every Man, as far as by it he does not
hurt and controul the Right of another." This check would be its only limitation.3 19 In words that carry much the same meaning conveyed in John
Milton's Areopagitica,3 2 ° Trenchard and Gordon called for government to
tolerate all manner of opinion. 32 '
Trenchard and Gordon condemned governors who cast judgment upon
the people based upon the people's spoken "Intentions," for interpretations
of these intentions by the authorities makes men subject "to the Caprices, to
the arbitrary and wild Will, of those in Power., 32 2 Trenchard and Gordon
argued for freedom to engage in criticism against governors and decried governmental interference with that freedom, explaining that to deny the public
even the right to speak "wrongly, irreligiously, or seditiously" will in the end
lead to a "servile Submission" by the people to their governors and to a
"most Stupid Ignorance. '3 2 3 In this Radical Whig philosophy lies an essential premise: The federal government can have no proper role in regulating
the spoken or printed word.324 In the words of Trenchard and Gordon:
318. 1 J. TRENCHARD & T. GORDON, supra note 295, at 96 (Letter No. 15, "Of Freedom
of Speech; That the Same is inseparable from publick Liberty," Feb. 4, 1720) (originally in vol.
I); id. at 246 (Letter No. 32, "Reflections upon Libelling," June 10, 1721) (originally in vol. I);
2 J. TRENCHARD & T. GORDON, supra note 295, at 292 (Letter No. 100, "Discourse upon

Libels," Oct. 27, 1722) (originally in vol. III); id. at 300 (Letter No. 101, "Second Discourse
upon Libels," Nov. 3, 1722) (originally in vol. III).
319.

1 J. TRENCHARD & T. GORDON, supra note 295, at 96.

320.

See J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), quoted in M. HUGHES, JOHN MILTON COM-

PLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 746 (1957).
321. 2 J. TRENCHARD & T. GORDON, supra note 295, at 295 (originally in vol. III).

Trenchard and Gordon wrote:
Whilst all Opinions are equally indulged, and all Parties equally allowed to speak

their Minds, the Truth will come out; and even, if they be all restrained, common
sense will often get the better: but to give one Side Liberty to say what they will, and

not suffer the other to say any thing, even in their own Defence, is comprehensive of
all the Evils that any Nation can groan under ....

Id.
322. Id. at 301.
323. Id. at 296-97.

324. For the view that the writings of Trenchard and Gordon did not form an expansive
free speech and press liberty theory at the founding, see Note, The Founding Fathers and
PoliticalSpeech: The FirstAmendment, the Press and the Sedition Act of 1798, 6 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REV. 395 (1987); see also L. LEVY, supra note 288; Kurland, The Original Understanding of the Press Provision of the FirstAmendment, 55 Miss. L.J. 225 (1985); cf. SMITH,
PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM (1988); Smith, PriorRestraint: OriginalIntentionsand Modern Interpretations,28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (1987); Anderson, supra note 288; Bogen,
The Origins of Freedom ofSpeech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429, 444-50 (1983).
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"[i]n those wretched Countries where a Man3 25
cannot call his Tongue his own,
he can scarce call any thing else his own."

2. A Private Communications Reserve
James Madison understood the Bill of Rights to "raise barriers against all
power in all forms and departments of Government., 326 In particular, the
first amendment was to disarm government of powers to trench upon a free
2 The first amendment created a guarantee that in matters of speech
press. 327
and press, no federal government presence would be tolerated.328 In this
manner, the speech and press liberties would be secured. Neither the prior
restraint of licensors nor the sanction of laws designed to curb speech after
329
publication were to be tolerated in this republic.
In effect, the first amendment was erected as a virtually impenetrable
shield, guarding speech and the press from the government; it was to foster
the free development of a private reserve of communication in which the
choice of what to say and how to say it would be left to the resourcefulness
of the individual, unaided and unencumbered by government.
B. The OriginalConception of the Marketplace of Ideas
The essential "marketplace of ideas" concept articulated by Trenchard
and Gordon has its most famous modern
expression in the dissent of Justice
330
Holmes in Abrams v. United States:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
325. 1 J. TRENCHARD & T. GORDON, supra note 295, at 96 (originally in vol. I).
326. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 299, at 1029.

327. Id. at 1033.
328. The First Amendment was to serve as "a denial to Congress of all power over the
press." See Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, House of Delegates Session of 17991800, in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILA-

1787 TOGETHER WITH THE JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 569 (J.
Elliot ed. 1987 reprint).
329. Id. at 569-70. Madison wrote:
Under [the British government], an exemption of the press from previous restraint by
licensers appointed by the King, is all the freedom that can be secured to it .... In
the United States, the case is altogether different.... [Here the] security of the
freedom of the press requires that it should be exempt, not only from previous restraint of the executive, as in Great Britain, but from legislative restraint also; and
this exemption, to be effectual, must be an exemption, not only from the previous
inspection of licensers but from the subsequent penalty of laws."
DELPHIA IN

Id.
330.

250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of
our Constitution.331
It must be remembered that Justice Holmes' dissent was written in response
to the Court's decision to affirm the conviction of a group of alleged Bolsheviks under the Sedition Act of 1918.332 The Bolsheviks had urged workers in ammunition plants to strike in order to preclude American military
involvement in the Russian Revolution.3 33
Therefore, the marketplace of ideas concept relied upon by Justice Holmes
was designed to deny government the power to interfere with the private
propagation of ideas and opinion. This prohibition would thereby permit
the free evolution of speech in the marketplace of ideas. Government would
play no role in determining the composition of the communications bazaar.
Whether one idea merchant or one hundred were present in the "marketplace" at a particular time was not to be a concern of government. The
choice of what to say and how to say it would be in the province of free
agents. Disparities in voice levels and persuasiveness would not be counteracted, but would be equally protected from the state. In this way, even with
the risk present that some methods of communication and some methods of
delivery or chosen messages may reach a larger audience and may be more
persuasive, the ultimate determination of worth would be entrusted to each
individual and not government. Or, as the Supreme Court has put it: "the
people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging
and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments .... But if there
be any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments . . . it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the First
334
Amendment.
C. The Modern Conception of the Marketplace of Ideas
Two years before Red Lion was handed down by the Court, Professor
Jerome A. Barron wrote an article that was to help define a new role for the
marketplace of ideas concept. 3 35 Historically, that concept had been relied
upon by the Supreme Court metaphorically, as descriptive of the govern331. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

332. Id. at 616 (majority opinion).
333. Id. at 620-21.
334. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978).
335. See Barron, Access to the Press--a New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641 (1967).
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ment-free, laissez-faire communications environment intended by the framers of the first amendment. In the framers' construct, the first amendment
served as the people's guardian against the State. Professor Barron used this
concept to invert its historical premise. He surmised that the marketplace of
ideas was an environment guaranteedby the first amendment. In Professor
Barron's construct, the first amendment afforded the State power over private
speech to ensure a fair mix of diverse views in society and to guard against
viewpoint domination by advocates of majoritarian views. Suddenly, an
amendment designed to deprive the government of power over speech had
become an amendment that mandated government policing of the content of
speech to ensure a preferred mix of ideological viewpoints. The government,
of course, would choose which views must be represented to attain the preferred mix. The essential basis of Professor Barron's construct, a right of
access by members of the public to means of mass communication in private
hands, would be adopted by the Court in Red Lion for application in the
broadcast media context and would be rejected by the Court in Tornillo for
application in the print media context.3 36 Consequently, comprehension of
Professor Barron's thesis is essential to understanding how the first amendment has been transformed in broadcast jurisprudence.
1. The First Amendment as Guarantorof Diversity
In his 1967 article, Professor Barron argued that the "marketplace of
ideas," once freely accessible to the public, had become foreclosed to all but
wealthy media moguls. 337 Speech power had come to rest in the hands of a

few. This disparity created an inequality of media access that Professor Barron believed could not be tolerated without depriving the public of a meaningful opportunity to participate in the system of free expression.338 To
336. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (regulation requiring right of access by candidates who had suffered a "personal attack" held constitutional) with
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (similar Florida right-of-reply
law applicable to print media held unconstitutional).

337. Barron, supra note 335, at 1643.
338. Id. at 1655-56. Professor Barron explained:
The avowed emphasis of free speech is still on a freeman's right to "lay what sentiments he pleases before the public." But Blackstone wrote in another age. Today
ideas reach the millions largely to the extent that they are permitted entry into the
great metropolitan dailies, news magazines, and broadcasting networks. The soap
box is no longer an adequate forum for public discussion. Only the new media of
communication can lay sentiments before the public, and it is they rather than government who can most effectively abridge expression by nullifying the opportunity

for an idea to win acceptance. As a constitutional theory for the communication of
ideas, laissez faire is manifestly irrelevant.
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ensure equal access to speech power, Professor Barron favored judicial intervention and government regulation. Professor Barron feared the threat of
censorship by government less than he feared censorship by private media
owners. 339 Professor Barron found "commercial considerations" of the private media to lead to a repression of ideas and insisted that "these media...
not be allowed to resist controls designed to promote vigorous debate and
expression. ' ' 3 ' To establish "state action" necessary for application of the
first amendment to private suppression of speech, Professor Barron called
for a "public function" theory whereby newspapers would be deemed public
entities, answerable to the state.3 4'
By believing the greatest dangers to free expression to lie in the hands of
media entrepreneurs rather than the government, and by construing media
of mass communication as imbued with a quasi-public status, Professor Barron was able to create a justification for the transformation of the first
amendment into an affirmative tool of the state. In Professor Barron's mind,
the state could be trusted to regulate access to the media and ensure "vigorous debate and expression. "342 He saw in this concept no abridgement of
the speaker's rights, but only an enhancement of the public's right of access. 34 3 The Barron thesis has acquired many adherents, albeit of varying
345
3
degrees of commitment, " and few detractors.
339. Id. at 1662. Professor Barron noted:
If dissemination of books can be prohibited and punished when the dissemination is
not for any saving "intellectual content" but for "commercial exploitation," it would
seem that the mass communications industry, no less animated by motives of "commercial exploitation," could be legally obliged to host competing opinions and points

of view.
Id.
340. Id. at 1663 (emphasis added).
341. Id. at 1669. Barron wrote:
A right of access to the pages of a monopoly newspaper might be predicated on
Justice Douglas's open-ended "public function" theory.... Such a theory would
demand a rather rabid conception of "state action," but if parks in private hands
cannot escape the stigma of abiding "public character," it would seem that a newspaper, which is the common journal of printed communication in a community, could
not escape the constitutional restrictions which quasi-public status invites. If monopoly newspapers are indeed quasi-public, their refusal of space to particular viewpoints
is state action abridging expression in violation of ... the first amendment.
Id.
342. Id. at 1663.
343. Id. Professor Barron explained: "[W]hat is suggested here is merely that legal steps
be taken to provide for the airing and publication of 'minority tastes or viewpoints,' not that
the mass media be prevented from publishing their views." Id.
344. Professor Owen M. Fiss is the latest, and perhaps the most strident, advocate of the
Barron thesis. See Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986).
Dissatisfied with laissez-faire allocation of speech power in a capitalist society, where speech
opportunities are distributed unequally, Professor Fiss, like Barron, values propagation of

460

2.
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The State as Regulator of Ideological Commerce

To attain his preferred mixture of views and information, Professor Bar"worthy" views more highly than autonomous selection of the content of messages by speakers
who currently occupy media fora. According to his construct, government should intervene to
assure speakers with messages that "enrich public debate" access to fora:
The power of media to decide what it broadcasts must be regulated because ... this
power always has a double edge: It subtracts from public debate at the very moment
that it adds to it ....
To date we have ambivalently recognized the value of state
regulation of this character on behalf of speech ... [b]ut these regulatory measures
are today embattled, and in any event, more, not less, is needed. . .. A commitment
to rich public debate will allow, and sometimes even require, the state to act in these
ways, however elemental and repressive they might at first seem. Autonomy will be
sacrificed, and content regulation sometimes allowed, but only on the assumption
that public debate might be enriched and our capacity for collective self-determination enhanced.
Id. at 1415. At root, both Fiss and Barron despise inequalities in speech power. The equality
principle has been fully developed by Professor Kenneth L. Karst. See Karst, Equality as a
Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975).
Other commentators have fallen short of endorsing the entire Barron thesis, but have perceived a role for government enhancement of certain favored speakers' rights to communicate.
See, e.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 671 (1970)("A limited
right of access to the press can be safely enforced. But any effort to solve the broader problems
of monopoly press by forcing newspapers to cover all newsworthy events and print all viewpoints under the watchful eyes of petty public officials is likely to undermine such independence as the press now shows without achieving any real diversity."); see also L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

676 (1978)("the right to know.., carries the implication

that government, while it may not close the market [place of ideas], may move to correct its
defects and regulate its incidental consequences"); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 19
(1960)("Congress is not debarred from all actions upon freedom of speech. Legislation which
abridges that freedom is forbidden but not legislation to enlarge and enrich it.").
Professor Bollinger has tried to have the best of both worlds, endeavoring to embrace the
perceived benefits of the traditional and the access approaches, and to distance himself from
their attendant detriments-thus raising profound questions as to whether such a "schizophrenic" effort could ever be workable. See Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and PublicAccess:
Toward a Theory of PartialRegulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976). Bollinger wrote:
The central problem in this area results from the complexity of the access issue.
The truth of the matter is, as the Court's opinions so plainly, if unintentionally,
demonstrate, that there are good first amendment reasons for being both receptive to
and wary of access regulation. This dual nature of access legislation suggests the
need to limit carefully the intrusiveness of the regulation in order to safely enjoy its
remedial benefits. Thus, a proper judicial response is one that will permit the legislature to provide the public with access somewhere within the mass media, but not
throughout the press. The Court should not, and need not, be forced into an all-ornothing position on this matter; there is nothing in the first amendment which forbids having the best of both worlds.
Id. at 27.
345. To date, among the critics of the Barron thesis, Professors David L. Lange, Louis L.
Jaffe and Matthew L. Spitzer have contributed the most well-developed counterarguments.
Professor Lange capably explodes many of the assumptions underlying Barron's construct,
particularly doubting that regulators may be trusted to promote anything but banal and cen-
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ron called for "a contextual approach" and "a purposive view of the first
amendment. ' 34 6 Essentially, under Professor Barron's system, by focusing
upon the content of the press, the government could determine when to invoke the "marketplace of ideas" rubric to require a delimitation of a broadcaster's or editor's freedom of speech in order to permit an expanded right of
access for an underrepresented individual or group. Professor Barron's system renders broadcasters and editors beholden and accountable to government. The government is empowered to intrude upon the discretion of
broadcasters and editors who fail to present a certain desired composite of
views and information by affording representative groups a right of nondiscriminatory access in order to voice their viewpoints. 347 Professor Barron
would have the legislature impose "the modest requirement" that newspapers be able to provide "rational grounds" for denying access to their
fora.3 48 He does not understand these restrictions to violate the first amendment. Rather, his "basic premise ...is that a provision preventing government from silencing or dominating opinion should not be confused with an
absence of governmental power to require that opinion be voiced.",349 For
Professor Barron, "the first amendment is read to state affirmative goals"
and "Congress is empowered to realize them." '350 Professor Barron does not
share the framers' distrust of state governance over speech, but instead embraces the state as his desired means to foster a structured composite of ideas
in the ideological marketplace.3 5 1
trist speech, rather than the robust and antagonistic debate envisioned by access proponents.
See Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media, 52 N.C.L.
REV. 1, 72-91 (1973). Professor Jaffe succinctly and cogently attacks the paternalistic faith of
the Barron thesis in the capacity of government regulators to better know what is in the viewing and listening interests of the American people than the public itself, and the assumption

that private censorship affecting but one news source is somehow more deleterious than government censorship. See Jaffe, The EditorialResponsibility of the Broadcaster:Reflections on
Fairnessand Access, 85 HARV. L. REv. 768, 786-87 (1972). Professor Spitzer demonstrates
the impracticability of Bollinger's argument for partial access. M. L. SPITZER, supra note 7, at
43-66.

346. Barron, supra note 335, at 1666.
347. Id. at 1667.

348.
349.
350.
351.

Id. at 1670.
Id. at 1676.
Id.
Barron, Access-The Only Choicefor the Media?, 48 TEX. L. REV. 766, 782 (1970).

Barron wrote:
Economic and technological factors have become such constraints on the life of
ideas that the laissez faire Millsian approach to freedom of expression that was the
natural accompaniment of the liberal free market economics of the nineteenth century is now a hopeless anachronism. But the democrative faith in reason-in judgments made by individual citizen decision-makers on the basis of information and
reflection-is still the basic assumption of our institutions. Unless we are ready to
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Professor Barron's view of the first amendment grants the state
supereditorial authority. The Commission's complex of ownership restrictions, designed to enforce viewpoint diversity by creating barriers to entry by
disfavored speakers, establishes as law a similar positivist perspective of the
first amendment. a52 It completely transforms the marketplace of ideas from
one uninhibited by state regulation in which anyone, whether his means be
humble or great, may voice an opinion, into a "marketplace" carefully monitored and checked by state censors. In Professor Barron's world, only the
soapbox speaker can communicate freely. As one accedes to means of communication that reach more people, one must accept state supervision and,
to a degree, state editorial control.
Once this perspective is accepted, our traditional understanding of "free
speech" is at an end. If free speech is denied to those who have become
media giants as a result of their satisfaction of public demand, then only
those who confront the public with views and information the public does
not value will receive full first amendment protection.
3.

The Resulting Loss in PersonalSpeech and Press Liberty

The framers viewed free speech as a critical check on maladministration in
government.353 Independent of government censors, a free press could
cause, in the words of the First Continental Congress, "oppressive officers
[to be] shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.", 354 The focus of the speech liberty was understood to rest in
the individual speaker, not in the listeners or readers. The First Continental
Congress explained: "The enjoyment of liberty, and even its support and
preservation, consists in every man's being allowed to speak his thoughts,
and lay open his sentiments.,

3 55

With the passage of time, the vital need to maintain the integrity of the
framers' intended private communications reserve has increased. Faced
with a central government of expansive size and virtually all-encompassing
regulatory scope, the private press remains one of the few institutions capable of challenging the authority of the state and ensuring the responsiveness
discard this faith, we should give considerable attention to the idea of access and to
attempts to realize that idea through new legislation and more intensive and sympathetic uses of existing law.

Id.
352. See supra notes 209-16 and accompanying text.
353. See, e.g., Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 529-38.
354. 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 108 (1968).

355. Id. at 110.
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and integrity of governmental officials. 356
In this environment, Professor Barron's view that government should be
entrusted with supereditorial authority over speech and press is a grave one
indeed. It fundamentally shifts the marketplace of ideas from its private,
unregulated, and interactive context to one within the compass of state control, making the marketplace ultimately responsible to government for determinations as to the choice of content expressed.
Professor Barron fails to appreciate the full significance of his transformation of the marketplace of ideas concept. A truly free and unrestricted marketplace of ideas does not guarantee the speaker access to another's private
property to propound a message.3 57 Rather, the "marketplace" is a metaphor for the denial of government power over speech and abdication of government control over part or all of a private forum.358 The marketplace's
function is not to guarantee that the speaker's chosen message will be appreciated or understood.
In the final analysis, Professor Barron's thesis fails. It presumes the impossible-that one individual or regulatory body can arrive at a "proper mix
of views and information" on matters as subjective as viewpoints on issues.
It also presumes that one individual or regulatory body can make such an
authoritative selection without discouraging private speech. Authoritative
selection varies from regulator to regulator, and it ultimately chills speech.
Even if authoritative selection could be made without a chilling effect, it
would nevertheless fail to satisfy the public better than market forces, for the
public prefers to make its own selections.
No one in a free state can be forced to view, listen, or read undesired ideas
356. Blasi, supra note 353, at 538. In the words of Professor Blasi:
The central premise of the checking value is that the abuse of official power is an

especially serious evil-more serious than the abuse of private power, even by institutions such as large corporations which can affect the lives of millions of people.
There are several reasons why misconduct by government officials may be regarded
as different in kind from misconduct by private persons. First, and perhaps most

important, the potential impact of government on the lives of individuals is unique
because of its capacity to employ legitimized violence. This means not only that in
most cases government can achieve a higher degree of compliance with its decisions
than can private bodies, but also that public officials control the resources which, if

misused, can do the maximum amount of harm.
Id.
357. Cf. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (citing Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)) (opening of a private shopping center to public does not create
first amendment rights in public beyond those existing under applicable law).

358. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Util. Comm. of California, 475 U.S. 1, 9
(1986). The Court emphatically stated that "[c]ompelled access like that ordered [by the Public Utilities Commission] . . . both penalizes the expression of particular points of view and
forces speakers to alter their speech to conform with an agenda they do not set." Id.
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or news. 359 Even in an unfree state, such ideas and news cannot be melded
into a human mind averse to them. Ultimately, free choice drives the system
contemplated by the framers of the first amendment. Free selection and interpretation of news by competing media and spokespeople ensures responsiveness to society's informational needs. 360 Any governmental tampering
with this system transforms the marketplace of ideas from an "uninhibited,
robust and wide-open" one 36 1 into an inhibited, insipid, and delimited one.
The result is a profound loss of the liberties of speech and press.
VII.

CONCLUSION: TOWARD INCLUSION OF THE BROADCAST PRESS
WITHIN THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S FULL PROTECTIVE
COMPASS

The American system of broadcast regulation abridges the first amendment.362 James Madison's first amendment was designed to deny the state
power over speech and the press. Free speech and a free press were to reside
in a private sphere of human communication which the state would be prohibited from regulating. The Communications Act of 1934 rests atop a false
premise-that the state can determine, consistent with the first amendment,
who may use a communications medium and what may be said upon that
medium. The government, through the FCC, consciously intends, by structuring the market and selecting who may speak, to shape the content of the
composite message disseminated over the broadcast media. Under the traditional concept of the first amendment, the state has no such power.
359. Professor Jaffe utterly rejects the notion that the people of America are lay dupes of
sophisticated media moguls, and doubts that the citizenry are in need of federal guidance on
what to watch, listen to, or read:
The implication that the people of this country--except the proponents of the [Barron] theory-are mere unthinking automatons manipulated by the media, without
interests, conflicts, or prejudices is an assumption which I find quite maddening. The
development of constitutional doctrine should not be based on such hysterical overestimation of media power and underestimation of the good sense of the American
people.
Jaffe, supra note 345, at 787.
360. Professor Jaffe again succinctly captures the point:
The proposition that the threat of government censorship is much less than that of
private censorship cannot survive the lesson of the government's attempt to suppress
publication of the Pentagon Papers. An argument of this sort can only be made by
one who, not having lived under a system of governmental censorship, appears to
have no idea what it really means. If one private person suppresses a fact there are
many others who may publish. Not so if the government forbids!
Id. at 786.
361. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
362. See, e.g., Lively, DeregulatoryIllusions and Broadcasting: The First Amendment's Enduring Forked Tongue, 66 N.C.L. REV. 963 (1988).
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In the print media context, this has been the prevailing constitutional understanding. In the broadcast media context, government control has been
deemed a necessity due to spectrum scarcity. Without a private right of
ownership, each user of spectrum is forced to remain beholden to the state
for its right of access to that spectrum. With the advent of Syracuse Peace
Council, spectrum scarcity no longer serves as a legitimate basis for applying
differing constitutional standards to the print and broadcast press. An entirely new system must come to replace the current broadcast regulatory
construct.
A free system of content-neutral, market allocation of broadcast property
rights would best comport with the first amendment. Such a system would
mirror the environment in which the print media has historically operated.
A property rights approach to private ownership of broadcast spectrum
would ensure the initiation of a new, fully deregulated, and maximally protected broadcast press. Although the specifics of such a proposal are beyond
the scope of this Article, many individuals have established the feasibility of
363
the property rights alternative.
A.

Elimination of StructuralRegulations as an Essential FirstStep

The movement toward affording the broadcast press full first amendment
protection under the print model cannot continue unless the Commission
removes not only its content but also its structural regulations. As this Article has attempted to show, the "content/structural" dichotomy is a meaningless distinction, for both regulatory regimes exist to enforce programming
viewpoint diversity and are aimed ultimately at controlling what is said and
who may speak. Denying a broadcaster the opportunity to speak ab initio in
any particular region of the country or on a nationwide basis, absent proof of
an antitrust violation, constitutes a direct government deprivation of the
speech and press liberties. The FCC's ownership rules are designed to prevent incipient undesirable concentrations in media markets without proof of
any undesirable effects. No basis exists for so weighty a decision as the one
363. See, e.g., Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON., Oct.

1959, at 1, 25-35. DeVany, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara & Scott, A Property System for Market
Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-EngineeringStudy, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 1499 (1969); Minasian, Property Rights in Radiation: An Alternative Approach to Radio Frequency Allocation, 18 J.L. & ECON. 221 (1975); see also M. Mueller, PropertyRights in
Radio Communications: The Key to the Reform of Telecommunications Regulation (Cato In-

stitute, Policy Analysis No. 11, 1980); M. Mueller, Privatizationof the Airwaves (Reason Foundation

Issue

Paper,

1980);

D.

WEBBINK,

FREQUENCY

SPECTRUM

DEREGULATION

ALTERNATIVES (prepared for FCC Office of Plans and Policy, Federal Communications
Comm'n, 1980).
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to foreclose the opportunity to speak through the coercive power of the
State.
By eliminating the ownership rules, the Commission will not only protect
the speech and press liberty, but will in many instances provide viewers and
listeners with more diverse programming. Elimination of the rules will also
permit media consumers to gain access to programs potentially superior to
those already offered in local markets. In short, elimination of the ownership rules will enable market demand to dictate in a more direct way the
type and quality of programs offered via the airwaves.
B. DOJAntitrust Law Enforcement Remains a Sufficient and
ConstitutionalSafeguardAgainst Undue Media Concentration
Accepting the premise that promoting content diversity through regulatory structuring of media markets offends the Constitution (or even that the
weight of the government's interest in enforcing viewpoint diversity is no
longer sufficient to overcome the first amendment interests of multiple-media
owners), the only legitimate remaining objective of FCC structural regulation is to prevent monopolization, if a monopoly can indeed be found in the
current media marketplace. The FCC has a specific statutory mandate to
enforce federal antitrust policies. 3" Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits
an acquisition when "the effect of such acquisition ...

may be substantially

to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly. ' 365 While the thrust
of the antitrust laws is preventive, to forestall incipient threats to competition, the FCC's policies have operated as a prior restraint, 366 prospectively
denying certain entities opportunities to speak in a misguided effort to structure the content of the aggregate message of American broadcasting, in the
absence of even a likelihood of monopolization.
In the abstract, the problem of loss of competition posed by common ownership of multiple media outlets is principally one of attainment of market
364. 47 U.S.C. § 314 (1982) (prohibiting acquisition or control of communications facilities
when the purpose or effect "may be to substantially lessen competition or to restrain commerce
... or unlawfully to create monopoly in any line of commerce"); id. § 313(b) (1982) (directing
the FCC to refuse station licenses to persons adjudged to have violated federal antitrust laws).
This mandate is separate and distinct from the FCC's general charge to regulate in what it
conceives to be the public interest, convenience and necessity, the standard which the Commission has traditionally invoked to justify its policy of enforced viewpoint diversity. See supra
notes 195-220 and accompanying text.
365. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). Section 314 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,
closely parallels this language. 47 U.S.C. § 314; see also supra note 364.
366. For a good working definition of prior restraints on speech, see Emerson, The Doctrine of PriorRestraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 648 (1955) ("The concept of prior
restraint, roughly speaking, deals with official restrictions imposed upon speech or other forms
of expression in advance of actual publication.").
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power by a few dominant firms through horizontal integration.3 67 To determine whether the effect of a particular combination may be "substantially to
lessen competition," the Antitrust Division of the United States Department
of Justice examines the degree of concentration within the relevant market.3 6' The Justice Department employs the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) to identify the extent of ownership concentration within a particular
market, and will take action to enforce the antitrust laws if a proposed consolidation renders that market unduly concentrated.3 69
In applying its Merger Guidelines, the Department of Justice seeks to promote economic efficiency by avoiding the exercise of market power by dominant firms. Unlike the Justice Department, the FCC has traditionally used
forced "competition" as an instrument of social policy, to promote access to
media outlets by entities likely to be barred by unfettered operation of the
market.3 70 Reliance on the Justice Department's quantitative model of de367. Broadly defined, a horizontal merger is one in which the producer of a product acquires the stock or assets of a competing firm serving the same geographical market. See 4 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 (1980). As used here, "market power" means the
ability of one or more firms to maintain prices at a level above that which would exist in a
perfectly competitive market. See United States Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 47
Fed. Reg. 28,493, 28,494 (1982) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines]. For the sake of brevity and
clarity, this Article focuses upon horizontal merger, avoiding other issues presented by media
market structure, such as vertical integration through common ownership of programming
sources, channels of distribution and outlets presented by the prospect of network/cable combinations. See supra notes 122-34.
368. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 367, at 28,497; Cohen & Sullivan, The HerfindahlHirschman Index and the New Antitrust Merger Guidelines: Concentratingon Concentration,
62 TEX. L. REV. 453, 458 (1983). See generally Symposium: 1982 Merger Guidelines, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 280 (1983).
369. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration is the sum of the
squares of the individual market shares of all the firms included in the market under the Justice Department's market definition standards. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 367, at
28,497. In evaluating horizontal consolidations, the Department of Justice employs the following rules: if a merger produces an HHI below 1000, the market is characterized as unconcentrated, and the prospect of anticompetitive effects is considered to be unlikely; if the
resultant HHI is between 1000 and 1800, the market is moderately concentrated, and the risk
of harm is considered to be greater; if the post-merger HHI is above 1800, the market is highly
concentrated, and the Department of Justice may challenge the consolidation. Id. at 28,49798.
370. See Cohen & Sullivan, supra note 368 at 457-58. While both the Justice Department
and the FCC have interests in addressing concentration of media ownership, the FCC has used
its authority to promote diversity of content through diversity of ownership, while the Justice
Department has focused exclusively on anticompetitive concerns. See B. COMPANIE, WHO
OWNS THE MEDIA? 310-11 (1982). These divergent regulatory interests have in the past
placed the Justice Department and the FCC at cross purposes in specific cases. For example,
in 1968, the Justice Department began challenging FCC decisions to grant broadcast licenses
to newspaper owners. Pressure from the Justice Department eventually manifested itself in the
form of the FCC's newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership rules, which have had the ironic effect of reducing media voices. Id. at 319-20.
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fining detrimental ownership concentration in local, regional, and national
markets would better comport with the FCC's present regulatory pursuit of
economic efficiency, and with its growing recognition of the questionable
constitutionality of regulating, directly or indirectly, programming content. 371 This delimitation on power secures the potential broadcaster's right
to speak, provided that in exercising that right, the broadcaster does not
purposefully foreclose opportunities for competitive speech in the marketplace of ideas. This comports with the philosophical basis for freedom of
speech. As John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon put it, the "Freedom of
Speech [is the right] of every Man, as far as by it he does not hurt and
control the Right of another., 3 7 2 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized
that "[t]he First Amendment affords not the slightest support for the contention that a combination to restrain trade in news and views has any constitu3 3
tional immunity., 1
Because the Justice Department has in place a content-neutral institutional mechanism to detect undue ownership concentration, and because it
does not share the FCC's history of precedent supporting regulations of who
may speak, the Justice Department is better suited to focus specifically on
anticompetitive effects. Because of its propensity to confuse its goal of promoting competition with its goal of promoting diversity of voices, the FCC
should abandon all prospective attempts to structure media markets in favor
of reliance upon Justice Department enforcement. 374 The retreat from
371. In its 1989 modification of the duopoly rule, see Duopoly Report and Order, supra
note 167, the Commission relied, in part, on a Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters market concentration study which employed the Justice Department's HHI, finding "that local radio markets
have HHI's well below the levels which trigger antitrust concerns under DOJ's Merger Guidelines." Id. at 5. Similarly, the FCC adopted its 1989 one-to-a-market waiver policy, Second
One-to-a-Market Report and Order, supra note 167, in reliance upon a CBS study employing
the HHI, which supported the Commission's finding that local markets were unconcentrated.
The Commission wrote: "based on these studies, we conclude that the increased availability of
broadcast outlets in large local markets has reduced the potential risk of harm to competition
that would be caused by relaxing or modifying the radio-television cross-ownership rule in
such markets." Id. at 6. Nevertheless, in both of these rulemakings, the Commission assiduously adhered to its traditional objectives, explaining that its new duopoly "approach best
serves the public interest by fostering our continuing goals of promoting economic competition
and diversification of programming and viewpoints .... " Duopoly Report and Order, supra
note 167, at 1. The commission emphasized that, in its new one-to-a-market waiver policy, it
was "retaining its traditional concern for encouraging diversity of programming and viewpoints" by encouraging diversity in the ownership of broadcast stations. Second One-to-aMarket Report and Order, supra note 167, at 3.
372. 1 J. TRENCHARD & T. GORDON, supra note 295, at 96.
373. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
374. Such action by the Commission would not be without precedent. See, e.g., Report,
Order and Policy Statement, Character Qualifications of Broadcast License Applicants, 102
F.C.C.2d 1179 (1986). In 1986, the Commission severely delimited the scope of its review of
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structural enforcement of viewpoint diversity policies should not continue to
occur in piecemeal fashion, but through a sweeping reevaluation of the constitutionality of the FCC's fundamental regulatory approach which carries
the lessons of Syracuse Peace Council to their logical conclusion.

the character qualifications of prospective broadcast licensees by announcing that it would no
longer inquire into allegations of anticompetitive conduct by an applicant until presented with
proof of an adjudicated violation of state or federal antitrust laws. Id. at 1201.

